The day of a potential invasion of Taiwan is drawing closer, but President Xi Jinping’s grip on power is not as unquestionable as it recently seemed
Over the past few months, several events have unfolded that suggest the day of a potential invasion of Taiwan is approaching. At the same time, they also point to the fact that President Xi Jinping’s rule is not as unshakable as it once appeared.
Of course, China will attempt to fully apply Sun Tzu’s philosophy to the end—winning the game over Taiwan without firing a shot or launching an invasion, especially since the last major war China fought was more than seventy years ago on the Korean Peninsula.
“Try to win without fighting. Before battle, undermine the enemy’s confidence through humiliation, ridicule, and the extinguishing of hope. Put them through demanding and painful trials. Corrupt everything good and advantageous to them, sow doubt in their leaders and force them into disgraceful behavior and betrayal. True excellence lies in defeating the enemy without a battle,” wrote Sun Tzu in his Art of War two and a half millennia ago.
On Taiwan, the seriousness of the threat of war is well understood—despite enduring 70 years of threats from the mainland—because China has never in its history been as powerful as it is now. The old Roman maxim by Flavius Vegetius Renatus, often seen as the Roman version of Sun Tzu, “Si vis pacem, para bellum” (“If you want peace, prepare for war”), is increasingly popular in Taiwan. No one wants a conflict with China, but neither does anyone want to fall under Beijing’s control. That’s why the vast majority hopes that the status quo will hold for the foreseeable future.
The Beginning of the End—or the End of Xi Jinping?
Clear shifts in the way Chinese state-controlled media report—reduced mentions of Xi Jinping and fewer quotes of his statements and “wisdom”—his absences from public life for weeks at a time (twice this year already), his failure to attend the BRICS summit in Brazil, and a series of dismissals or mysterious disappearances of officials considered close to Xi have all fueled speculation about a possible leadership change in the People’s Republic.
The appearance of Xi’s daughter, Mingze, at a dinner with Belarusian President Lukashenko triggered conflicting interpretations. Mingze studied at Harvard under a false name and has never appeared at a public event alongside her father since he became president. To some, her appearance signaled that Xi wants to position her as his successor; to others, it was simply a gesture of courtesy toward Lukashenko. The mystery deepened when all news of Mingze’s presence was scrubbed from party-controlled media.
Another indication that something is brewing behind the scenes is Xi’s delegation of major and sensitive portfolios to his associates. Premier Li Qiang is handling domestic economic issues. Vice Premier He Lifeng is in charge of the customs war dossier with the U.S. Cai Qi, a member of the Politburo, is responsible for cyber challenges, and Wang Huning remains the party’s chief ideologue and gray eminence.
This decentralization of power can be interpreted in two ways: either as laying the groundwork for a race to succeed Xi as head of the party and the state, or as an attempt by Xi to regain party trust, which has been significantly shaken due to a series of missteps and poor outcomes in recent years—from the mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic to the economic downturn.
The increasingly prominent role of the military and certain generals should also not be overlooked. With exponentially growing military budgets and weapons development—as well as plans for a Taiwan invasion—the People’s Liberation Army has become a major force. It’s not unthinkable that Xi might use the army to stay in power or solidify his hold. However, that’s a double-edged sword: the military might instead leverage its position to install a new leader in Zhongnanhai.
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