Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently dusted off an old Russian saying: “Where the Russian soldier plants his foot, it is ours,” sending a clear signal that Moscow will not give up the occupied territories in Ukraine—quite the opposite. In Putin’s imagination, since Russians and Ukrainians are the same people, all of Ukraine is Russian.
The uncrowned czar also had a direct message for those warning about Russia’s economic troubles and the looming recession. On that occasion, he paraphrased Mark Twain: “Reports of the death of the Russian economy are greatly exaggerated.”
Former U.S. President Donald Trump did an enormous favor for Putin by returning him to the international stage and re-legitimizing him as a relevant partner and interlocutor. Trump not only pulled Putin out of isolation but preemptively absolved him of responsibility for crimes for which an indictment was issued at The Hague, even removing the label “aggressor” for Russia in NATO documents related to the war in Ukraine.
Trump’s frustration with Putin stems from his misunderstanding of the Russian president and Russian politics. Trump expected that, out of gratitude, Putin would meet his demands and ensure a ceasefire with Ukraine—a tangible foreign policy success for the American president.
To be fair, Putin made a “beau geste” in the Iranian case when he guaranteed that Russia would not obstruct American bombings of nuclear facilities and depots in the Islamic Republic. However, it is more than clear that Putin is not ready to abandon the idea of total victory in Ukraine for the sake of a new U.S.–Russia partnership with Trump.
Russia’s Narrative Shift
Meanwhile, in Moscow, there’s been a total reversal of the narrative: “Russia didn’t attack Ukraine; the West used the Nazi regime in Ukraine as a battering ram to strategically defeat Russia.” These are the words of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, considered the “dove among hawks” in Putin’s circle.
The militarization of Europe, a direct result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is now presented as further proof that France, Germany, and the U.K. have returned to an era of attempting to conquer all of Europe, especially the Russian Empire or later the USSR. In other words, few ordinary Russians now remember why or how the invasion of Ukraine—or the “Special Military Operation”—began.
For a long time, the Kremlin has planned a new “Yalta Conference.” Trump is the first U.S. president since the fall of the Berlin Wall ready to accept a planetary reshuffling of power, one of the key reasons why Putin and his officials carefully choose their words when speaking about Trump.
China’s role is vital for Russia; without Beijing’s support, Moscow would be in a much weaker position. Unsurprisingly, Moscow’s main streets were recently filled with Chinese proverbs and slogans, often used by President Xi Jinping, displayed in both Chinese and Russian.
Flattery toward the Chinese leader has reached levels never before seen in Russian history for a foreign leader. Not only are Moscow’s streets decorated with Xi’s quotes from Confucius and Li Bai, but a national television series titled “Favorite Sayings of Xi Jinping” is being aired.
Putin’s Three Domestic Objectives
Putin has achieved three domestic goals:
- It no longer matters whether the decision to invade Ukraine was right—the belief is now entrenched that defeat would endanger the foundation of the Russian Federation.
- A vast majority of Russians believe their country is at war with the West, not Ukraine.
- The idea of a “Russian civilization” with a mission to protect the world from evil or neo-Nazism—however vaguely defined—is increasingly accepted in Russian society.
These signals do not bode well, as they virtually block any path to compromise on the Ukraine issue. Complicating factors are the interests of China, the EU, and to some extent, the U.S. For Beijing, a Russian defeat would strike a blow to its imperial ambitions by strengthening the West. For the EU, surrendering Ukraine would open the door to new Russian invasions—this time against its Baltic members. Trump’s administration shows little interest in Ukraine but cannot allow Russia, with China’s support, to triumph.
The only regional power interested in a “draw,” in sports terms, is Turkey. For Erdoğan, a victorious EU or liberal-democratic bloc is undesirable, but letting Moscow dominate the northern Black Sea is strategically disastrous. Turkey’s engagement and mediation efforts aim at ensuring that neither side wins, driven by national interest. A ceasefire is possible, maybe even by this fall, but it would likely only be a pause before renewed conflict.
In Russian public discourse, there’s now a parallel between the “Great Patriotic War” (World War II) and the “Special Military Operation,” equating Nazi Germany with today’s EU. With Trump’s return, the line separating the EU and the U.K. from the U.S. becomes increasingly distinct.
Three and a half years of war in Ukraine have shown that both the EU and the U.S. underestimated Russian society’s willingness to follow Putin’s imperial plans—but also that Russia underestimated Ukraine’s resolve and the motivation of a people defending their homeland. Russia is superior in weapons and troop numbers, but Ukraine leads in morale, which is evident on the battlefield, where the front line has barely shifted.
A New Yalta in Beijing
Kremlin plans have long prioritized organizing a new “Yalta” where three major powers divide the world into zones of influence. Trump is the first American leader since 1989 ready to embrace this global reshuffle—an opportunity the Kremlin won’t miss. China also supports the idea, which aligns with Mao Zedong’s concept of a “strategic stalemate”—buying time to catch up with the U.S.
The U.S.–China–Russia summit could coincide with the 80th anniversary of China’s victory over Japan and the end of WWII in early September. Putin has confirmed his attendance, as Xi visited Moscow on May 9. Trump’s participation remains uncertain. The fact that Trump’s ultimatum deadline aligns with China’s celebration opens room for interpretation—from coincidence to a calculated plan.
In such a tripartite division, each power sees a benefit:
- The U.S. offloads its global policeman role after 35 years.
- Russia gains de facto recognition as a superpower.
- China delays direct confrontation with the U.S., for which it is not yet ready.
However, unlike 1945, today there are many strong regional actors—like the EU, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, India, and Japan—who can claim autonomous roles or their own spheres of influence.
International law is defeated, ridiculed, and abused by all sides. Only the EU still clings to its principles—albeit with waning enthusiasm. The new world order will not rest on legal norms but on the balance between major, regional, and local powers. That doesn’t mean authoritarian regimes will necessarily dictate the new order.
Russian Civilization and “Siberization”
The term “Russian civilization” has become popular in Moscow’s political and intellectual circles, especially close to the ruling elite. It encompasses patriotism, serving the state, collectivism, acceptance of top-down decisions, and a historical mission to shield the world from “Nazism”—a catch-all term for evil in modern Russia—and to be a barrier between East and West.
Thus, Russia is portrayed as a “state-civilization,” and the invasion of Ukraine as a defense of this civilization. It’s not mere propaganda; it’s preparing the public to bear greater burdens and pay a higher price. Patriotism is no longer enough—citizens must believe they are more than a nation; they are a civilization.
This shift necessitates moving the center of gravity eastward—away from centuries of Eurocentrism—toward “Siberization.” After the war, this would symbolize a pivot east. But not too far, or Russia risks subordination to China. The goal remains preserving an autonomous “Russian civilization,” a debate that fuels Russia’s perennial identity crisis.
Moscow’s Goals
Trump’s return to the White House solidified the Kremlin’s resolve to go all the way. Reports from the front confirm intensified warfare since January. Putin believes no U.S. president, including Trump, can stop him.
Russia aims to fully occupy four regions it has annexed de jure: Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Only Luhansk is fully under Russian control; the others remain divided.
Russia has abandoned plans to conquer Ukraine militarily but not to dominate it politically—by other means. Replacing President Zelensky is a precondition; the priority is to install an anti-Western government in Kyiv, not necessarily a pro-Russian one.
Russia’s propaganda machine, both online and in the media, has shown in Romania, Georgia, Moldova, and Bulgaria that it can influence elections and fuel anti-Western sentiment. The Kremlin no longer dreams of global revolution; instead, it helps anti-Western forces gain power, embracing the old maxim: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
Ukraine’s Goals
Ukraine’s goals are:
- A ceasefire
- Minimal territorial loss
- EU membership
- Security guarantees in lieu of NATO membership
A ceasefire is the only realistically achievable goal. Returning to pre-February 2022 borders is unlikely. EU membership is a distant prospect. Support and sympathy from the EU will vanish once the fighting stops, and membership is impossible during an ongoing war. NATO membership is unrealistic, but security guarantees—mainly logistical, not military—are possible.
Russian and U.S. plans converge on holding elections in Ukraine, but a ceasefire is a prerequisite. Moldova’s parliamentary elections on September 28 will also be pivotal.
Trump’s Role
For Trump, the priority is to freeze the conflict and leave it to future leaders to resolve. His strategy relies on three pillars:
- No resolution is possible as long as Putin remains in power.
- Trump believes sanctions hurt the U.S. as well.
- Conditions must be created to prevent Russia from siding with China in a future U.S.–China confrontation.
Thus, the U.S. offer to Russia was:
- De jure recognition of Crimea as Russian territory
- De facto acceptance of the current occupation
- Ceasefire as a trigger for peace talks
- Territorial issues deferred to future generations
- Compensation for Ukraine
The harsh truth is that Trump and his circle do not want the U.S. to spend another dollar on Ukraine. Kyiv needs about €19 billion annually just to avoid bankruptcy—not including weapons. Under Trump, the burden of financing Ukraine and providing arms falls entirely on the EU.
The U.S. is focused on China and the Middle East. China is its strategic rival—a rare bipartisan consensus in Washington. Israel is also a priority for Trump, due to electoral support from Jewish voters and evangelicals, which helped him win in 2024.
The EU’s Role
NATO EU members, with help from the U.K., defused a ticking time bomb at the NATO summit in The Hague. Trump had threatened to theatrically leave the summit. The Europeans agreed to raise military spending to 5%, removing Trump’s main pretext for triggering a crisis within NATO.
The European Union is playing the card of the so-called “Black Sea strategy,” which envisions three main directions of action: security and defense cooperation with the integration of ports and construction of infrastructure that guarantees high and rapid mobility of military troops, as well as finding nautical routes that would ensure continued trade—even with Russia, behind Crimea; integration in the digital sector, transportation, and energy to secure connection with Central Asia and the Middle East; and strengthening cooperation in combating climate change and mitigating the effects of humanitarian disasters.
One of the main tasks of European leaders is to explain to and convince Donald Trump and his closest associates that stabilizing Ukraine is not possible without also stabilizing and strengthening its surrounding region. The fight for Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia are all pieces of the same puzzle in which Ukraine is a central part.
WHAT IF PUTIN WANTS TO GO ALL THE WAY
Russia’s demands are formulated in such a way that it is legitimate to suspect that the Kremlin is playing for a long and exhausting war, calculating that it is more prepared and better equipped for that type of conflict: withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from four regions (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson); international recognition of the Russian Federation within its new borders; permanent neutrality of Ukraine, without weapons of mass destruction and without foreign troops on its soil; and an irrevocable renunciation of any demands for war reparations.
From this, one can conclude that Moscow is not seeking compromise or any sustainable and acceptable solution, but rather the unconditional capitulation of Ukraine—or war until further notice, especially if it has China on its side.
Russia’s war economy, despite increasingly obvious difficulties, still functions and provides certain benefits that allow Putin’s regime to continue conducting the “special operation.” At the same time, thanks to the invasion of Ukraine, the regime has further strengthened its control over the economy and society as a whole, and whatever little freedom remained in Russia’s public sphere has been crushed. All factions within the government have been brought into line and compelled to strike a patriotic tone. Does anyone remember Prigozhin and his criticisms, threats, and march on Moscow?
A ceasefire—or even reaching a permanent peace agreement—would produce, regardless of the terms, tectonic shifts in society and uncertainty—two things to which the Kremlin is allergic. Currently, there are over 600,000 soldiers at the front. Their mass return home would create major tensions for various reasons, from employment issues to psychological trauma and all the consequences that come with it. And we shouldn’t forget that among them are thousands of criminals convicted of the most serious offenses.
TRUMP’S THREATS AND SANCTIONS
Trump’s threats to Putin with punitive measures if he doesn’t stop the war, and the new EU sanctions package, did not leave much of an impression on the leaders of the Russian Federation. Only Russian economic experts expressed concern, analyzing the consequences of sanctions, from inflation to public spending and possible recession. However, that’s a less important factor since power in Russia has never been based on the economy. Its foundations have always been power, force, glory, national pride, and the idea of a special mission of the Russian people.
Moscow still believes that a solution can be found with Donald Trump that would satisfy the Kremlin’s appetite and allow Putin to declare victory in the conflict with Ukraine. This explains why the Russian president and his closest associates did not respond to Trump’s fifty-day ultimatum, insisting instead that the American president is consistent in his belief that direct communication with Russia must be maintained. Also, while Putin and other Russian officials use very measured language toward Trump, Russian propagandists are firing on all cylinders at the “deep state,” blaming it for Trump’s change of stance, while also not sparing the U.S. president for failing to dismantle the “deep state.” A curious detail is that both Putin’s and Trump’s propaganda target the same enemy: Joe Biden. Both accuse the former president of being responsible for the war in Ukraine.
The past three and a half years of war in Ukraine have shown that the EU and the U.S. underestimated the willingness of Russian society to follow President Putin in executing his imperial plans, but also that the Russians underestimated Ukraine’s determination to defend its homeland and the motivational factor of a people defending itself from an aggressor.
The eighteenth package of sanctions against Russia has been in the works since May, practically since the announcement of a joint ultimatum by the European wing of NATO and the U.S. to Putin: ceasefire or devastating sanctions.
The latest round of measures targeted not only the energy sector but also banking, as well as third countries and their financial institutions or companies that enabled Moscow to bypass the sanctions wall. Chinese companies that directly or indirectly supported the Russian military industry or advanced technology sectors also ended up on the list of sanctioned companies.
Unlike previous sanctions packages, where the Hungarian prime minister was the main obstacle, this time it was Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico who stood in the way of the decision. Fico first demanded that Slovakia be exempt from the sanctions regime, then insisted on financial compensation, and in the end, received guarantees from the European Commission that it would intervene in favor of Bratislava if necessary.
In Brussels corridors, it is said that Trump’s recent shift in position toward Putin had more influence on Fico’s and even Orbán’s behavior than pressure from the EU itself.
Greece, Malta, and Cyprus also voiced objections, particularly regarding the establishment of a price cap on Russian oil. All in all, the difficulties and time it took to reach the eighteenth package of sanctions against Russia indicate that the EU has reached its limit—and that every new package of sanctions will be a double-edged sword, especially if not coordinated with the U.S.
The real “game changer” in policy toward Russia would be the introduction of the same type of sanctions wall as applied to Iran—meaning sanctions against all economic, banking, and political entities doing business with Russia in sectors crucial to the military and economic capacity of the Russian Federation.
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