Increased NATO Activity in Eastern Europe Bring a Major Incident Closer — Aimed at Portraying Russia as a “Paper Nuclear Power.” Putin Says the Plan Won’t Succeed
Vladimir Putin has once again stated that Russia is ready to respond to any threat — not with rhetoric, but with concrete “military-technical measures.” The message is primarily directed at NATO, whose activity on the eastern flank has intensified in recent weeks following alleged incursions by Russian drones into Poland and incidents involving military aircraft over Estonia and the Baltic. In Moscow, these responses are seen as an attempt to portray Russia as indecisive or incapable of responding.
On the NATO side, a combination of political statements and operational actions dominates. Several European governments are calling for a “firmer” approach, and some officials openly speak of being ready to shoot down aircraft operating without authorization in airspace considered to be under allied control. The rhetoric is literally escalating by the day (for example, the Finnish president is urging Europe to “prepare to fight Russia”).
At the same time, a new operational scheme of enhanced surveillance and interception has been launched in the East. This creates an impression of action but also increases the risk of miscalculation: incidents in a complex air environment can develop rapidly, and detection and attribution of targets are not immediate.
The example of Poland illustrates this point. Initially, the public was told that the event was the result of a Russian drone, only for it to be admitted later that a Polish air defense missile had hit a house. In an environment of heightened rhetoric and pressure to “respond immediately” (a phrase increasingly repeated these days), such confusion can easily become a trigger for direct conflict. In Russia, these episodes are viewed as evidence that part of the pro-Ukrainian bloc wants to turn every situation into a pretext for escalation.
In the Baltic states and the UK, there are growing calls for confronting Russian aircraft “operating without authorization.” Such statements may reinforce a political image of determination but simultaneously lower the threshold between interception and more forceful responses. Once that threshold is lowered, it’s hard to raise it again — and each new incident over the Baltics or Poland could escalate the entire European security system. Especially since there is no functional joint NATO–Russia channel governing the rules of air interception and signaling.
Moscow responds on two tracks — firm and predictable in military-technical terms, and at the same time open to talkswith the U.S. on arms control. Putin explicitly emphasized that Russia can and will respond to existing and new threats, including deployments that change the balance of arms in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, the decision to abandon the unilateral moratorium on land-based intermediate-range missiles was not symbolic, but a response to Western plans to modernize and relocate systems that shorten decision-making time and reduce predictability.
At the same time, the Kremlin is offering to extend the last remaining U.S.–Russia strategic arms agreement. The idea is to keep upper limits on deployed warheads and delivery systems until a new, more comprehensive framework is agreed upon. The New START treaty expires in February 2026 and has already been functioning at a reduced level for some time due to mutual suspension of verification mechanisms. Still, maintaining quotas — even without an ideal inspection regime — would mean keeping the deterrence boundaries and lowering the incentive for costly and destabilizing arms races.
It’s worth recalling that the infrastructure of arms control has largely been dismantled over the past two decades. Treaties that restricted testing, deployment, and transparency — from the INF Treaty to Open Skies and the CFE Treaty, as well as the older ABM regime — have been gradually shut down or abandoned. In such an environment, any new deployment that shortens warning and response time multiplies the risk of mistakes. Russia’s insistence on “indivisible security” and “mutual respect for interests” can be read as a call to restore at least a minimal platform of predictability. But, at least in its relationship with Europe, those Russian messages have been completely ignored.
At the political level, de-escalation attempts between Washington and Moscow have had limited results. The meeting in Alaska didn’t reverse the trend, and current dynamics in U.S. politics are notoriously unpredictable (especially in the Trump era!). Still, the fact that Russia is proposing to extend the treaty indicates the Kremlin wants to clearly separate strategic stability from the Ukrainian battlefield and prevent the general security situation from sliding into a no-limitsscenario.
In contrast, some pro-Ukrainian lobbies in the Euro-Atlantic space clearly count on a “testing strategy” — to encourage the downing of Russian aircraft outside the Ukrainian battlefield, expect no retaliation, and then politically capitalize on the narrative of a “paper power.” In their calculation, this would weaken Russian deterrence and spark internal tensions in Moscow. But this is a short-sighted strategy. Russia has repeatedly shown that it responds to security threats with a mix of symmetrical and asymmetrical measures — from electronic warfare and sensor disruption to targeted missile redistribution and demonstrative tests — without needing spectacular but risky moves.
It’s also important to note that shooting down Russian targets outside the conflict zone would have negligible impacton the operational balance in Ukraine but would significantly raise the political cost for Europe. In such a scenario, Moscow would gain legitimate grounds for retaliatory actions that increase the cost of Western military engagement — including disrupting surveillance and navigation in critical corridors — without crossing the line into open war with NATO. This is precisely the arena where Russia has a broad spectrum of options.
Ultimately, Putin’s message to the West is unambiguous: Russia will not allow a model in which others define the rules, while it is expected to show restraint without reciprocal limitations. The willingness to respond goes hand in hand with willingness to negotiate. If there is a desire to extend the strategic arms agreement, it should be used to simultaneously open technical channels to prevent incidents — protocols for interception, identification, and data sharing. This doesn’t require political capitulation, but a minimum of responsibility.
Europe should change course, but unfortunately, there are still no signs of that. Otherwise, escalation by inertia will become the norm — a battlefield where those who advocate provocation already have the upper hand.
Russia has made it clear that it will not allow a scenario where its deterrence is tested without consequences. That message does not exclude dialogue — on the contrary, it makes it necessary. If the West wants stability, it must accept that security in Europe cannot be unilaterally defined. Unfortunately, the current rhetoric and media fearmongering are so strong that the very idea of de-escalation is portrayed as defeat — or worse, madness. The greatest danger at this moment comes from the darker side of the pro-Ukrainian lobby, the one that literally prefers war escalation. If it turns out that this faction is spreading, and has become dominant in the halls of power in Warsaw, Helsinki, and the three Baltic capitals, then the conclusion is very grim: in Ukraine, we are not waiting for the end of the war, but for its eruption into something bigger.
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