Europe keeps emphasizing the need to prepare for a “major war in a few years” – but does it really think Russia will wait for its enemy to be ready?
In the last two days, Denmark has shut down airports due to multiple incursions by unidentified drones, also triggering alerts at military bases. Police and military speak of “systematic” intrusions, the government of a “hybrid attack,” and some European officials link it to “state actors.” Meanwhile, Poland earlier this month shot down drones in its airspace, Romania scrambled fighter jets, and Estonia, after a Russian military overflight, activated NATO Article 4 consultations. Moscow denies all allegations.
In New York, on the sidelines of the UN, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterates that the Ukrainian crisis is “orchestrated by the West” and that NATO and the EU are “de facto waging war” against Russia. On the other hand, a number of European governments in recent weeks have spoken more openly about “preparations for a larger conflict within a few years.” In this tense political climate, unidentified drones over Danish infrastructure seem like a critical symptom – incidents on the edge, but (for now) below the threshold of direct armed response.
Danish police report that drones were seen near multiple airports and military locations, as well as over the North Sea, temporarily paralyzing both civil and military traffic. For now, authorities are not shooting at drones due to “safety risks,” but are stepping up protection of critical infrastructure. Poland has taken a more radical approach – suspicious drones have been shot down, and Warsaw was among the first to request allied consultations. Across European capitals, pressure is growing for accelerated investments in anti-drone capabilities, because, if the claims are true – the EU’s airspace is porous.
However, the analytical framework is broader and more dangerous. After the Trump–Putin meeting in Alaska in August, which, albeit cautiously, opened a channel for a ceasefire, there appeared to be a window for a peace process. Russia signaled that it was not rejecting a deal to stabilize the front line and begin political talks. But after the U.S. president backed away from pressuring Kyiv to accept a frozen conflict, the old logic of geopolitics prevailed in Washington – rising tensions between Russia and Europe strategically benefit the United States.
It’s not even necessary to prove exactly who is controlling the drones over Denmark to see where this is headed. Maybe they are Russian. Maybe they’re false flag operations. In a war where both sides are massively jamming GPS and sending decoys – drones programmed to confuse enemy air defenses – the room for misinterpretation is enormous. That’s exactly why it’s the West’s responsibility not to build policy on assumptions and insinuations, but on verified facts, and to refrain from escalatory moves that cannot later be reversed.
Kyiv, understandably exhausted, has a vested interest in NATO becoming more deeply involved in the conflict – even through “gray zones” – as it would relieve pressure on Ukraine’s military and budget. But therein lies a dangerous trap: shifting the weight of the war to NATO’s border doesn’t mean safety, it means the risk of a chain reaction. One downed drone over the Baltic Sea, one misidentification over Jutland, and suddenly Article 4 turns into a political centrifuge that easily grinds down rationality. Then the game stops being about Ukraine – it becomes an existential issue for the entire continent’s security.
To make the paradox complete, it’s European decisions themselves that are pouring fuel on the fire. Denmark is opening rocket fuel production near Skrydstrup for Kyiv. At the same time, it admits to “gaps in readiness” to defend its skies. Poland is ramping up rhetoric about “provocations,” Germany talks of overflights, and NATO headquarters states that “this is not an isolated incident.” None of this keeps a cool head – it builds an atmosphere of preemptive blame and preparation for a larger test of strength.
Meanwhile, Russia is taking Europe’s messaging literally: if Berlin, Warsaw, and Brussels are talking about a “conflict in a few years,” why wait for the opponent to mature? In that logic, Moscow will do everything to deny its enemy the comfort of strategic preparation. This doesn’t mean Russia wants a war with NATO today, but it does mean it won’t let the West choose the time and place. That’s why these fringe incidents – where everyone can do everything, but no one does anything “officially” – have become the new normal.
In the United States, the tone fluctuates. Early on, Trump suggested some of the overflights “could be a mistake,” but then, under allied pressure and after meeting with Zelensky, stated that NATO should shoot down anything entering its airspace. That’s a political course correction that emboldens hardliners on both sides. If the path from Alaska toward peace is closing, then the highway to a major incident is opening.
As for the facts, only a few things are currently certain: drones have been spotted over both civilian and military facilities – some countries have chosen to shoot them down, others haven’t. There is no public, unambiguous, forensic evidence linking the Kremlin to specific flights. Everything else is conjecture, and conjecture is no basis for war. Yet the West in recent years has turned conjecture into strategy, suspicion into policy, and policy into sanctions and military spiral escalation.
For Europe, this is a double mistake. First, it distances Europe from its own interest – peace on the continent and economic recovery after self-inflicted energy wounds. Second, it casts Europe in the role of a testing ground for theories of “deterrence” and “hybrid warfare,” while real life – from flights to ships to terminals – becomes hostage to endless scenarios. If the U.S. benefits geopolitically from Russia and Europe drowning in mutual distrust, European elites should at least be able to say: enough.
The way out isn’t complicated, but it requires the courage to resist inertia. First, a transparent, internationally monitored investigation of all incidents – with full publication of raw radar and satellite data. Second, direct Washington–Moscow and Brussels–Moscow channels for urgent technical deconfliction, including drone protocols: who can shoot, when and how, with what notice and what forensics afterward. Third, a return to the Alaska track – ceasefire, frozen lines, prisoner exchanges, and reopening of economic valves that reduce the motivation for sabotage games.
Finally, the truth must be named: the West’s escalation toward Russia, guided by the logic that “just a bit more pressure” will yield a better position tomorrow, is already creating on-the-ground conditions for disaster today. Despite harsh rhetoric, Russia has on several occasions signaled its willingness for a deal to stop the spiral. Instead of taking up that willingness, European policy chooses to rumble forward. And rumbling, when it hits the edge, usually ends in a crash.
If the continent wants peace, then every drone flying today – unsigned, unannounced, unaccountable – is all the more reason to stop, not to rush. Because what now looks like a “test” of nerves could, tomorrow, become the spark. And a spark, between Russia and NATO, doesn’t allow for a second chance.
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