Modi Does Not Tolerate Pressure – After Being Punished for Buying Russian Oil, He Heads to Beijing, and That Meeting Could Lay the Groundwork for a Global Super-Alliance
Modi’s swift departure to China – immediately after Washington imposed 50% tariffs on Indian goods due to India’s purchase of Russian oil – could be a move that profoundly reshapes global relations. For years, the West, especially the U.S., saw New Delhi as a potential “fifth column” within BRICS: a partner that would keep its distance from Beijing and steer the bloc in a more “acceptable” direction. That framework now seems to be falling apart. Trust in New Delhi is rapidly eroding, and along with an instinct for self-preservation, it is pushing the country toward Moscow and Beijing.
For years, India was a central pillar of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad alliance (Australia, Japan, India, the U.S.). Suddenly, it’s being treated almost identically to China, with tariffs that differ only in nuance. The message was clearly understood in Delhi: double standards and interference in sovereign decisions. After 25 years of building a narrative of a “natural” partnership between Washington and New Delhi, a single decision revealed just how conditional that partnership is. Trump approached India as a disciplinary case rather than an equal partner. But this time, he may have taken on a player too large to corner, triggering a process that until recently seemed unimaginable – political rapprochement between two Asian rivals.
Modi’s visit to China marks a serious shift in regional and global dynamics. In New Delhi, this move is not seen as a mere technical issue of trade policy but as a political signal: the partnership with Washington has become subject to sudden reversals. In that context, Modi’s visit to Beijing carries the weight of a possible beginning of a new era, with consequences for BRICS, the Quad, and the architecture of global trade.
In recent years, India has been a key part of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy: the “largest democracy,” a Quad member, and a fast-growing economy. The imposition of high tariffs – justified by claims that New Delhi is helping fill Russia’s coffers by buying its oil – has changed perceptions of how reliable that partnership is.
The immediate consequence is a rapid reassessment of India’s foreign policy course. New Delhi is not giving up its “strategic autonomy,” but it is tangibly seeking partnerships where cooperation comes without strings attached. This means intensifying political and economic ties with Moscow and Beijing. Modi’s visit to China – his first in seven years – fits into this trend. The Chinese side has stated that cooperation with India has an “internal logic” and is not aimed at third parties. The very fact that the meeting is happening signals a willingness to carefully reduce tensions and open up economic channels.
The energy picture helps explain why such a shift is possible. The share of Russian oil in India’s imports has risen from a negligible 0.2% to about 35% of total imports, driven by steady discounts of 6–7% and reliable deliveries. Moscow is also offering expansion into oil derivatives, coal, and potentially liquefied natural gas. Instead of weakening, financial flows within BRICS have been strengthened. Another key shift is the gradual strengthening of payment mechanisms in national currencies, reducing reliance on the U.S. dollar and making these economies less vulnerable to sanctions tools.
Within BRICS, India has traditionally held a middle-ground position – a member of the Global South with deep ties to Russia, but cautiously open to the West. A broader wave of tariff and political pressure on BRICS members – including threats of additional tariffs – has had the opposite effect from what was intended (assuming Trump wants U.S. dominance, and there’s no reason to think he doesn’t!): it’s closing ranks. Brazil is deepening ties with China and promoting de-dollarization; Russia is acting as the energy and political glue; China is emerging as both a market and a source of capital. The revival of the Russia–India–China (RIC) trilateral and cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) provide an institutional framework for this convergence.
Of course, perspective is important. India–China relations are burdened with deep layers of mistrust: the 1962 border war, decades-long territorial disputes, and especially the bloody Galwan Valley incident in 2020. After that, New Delhi banned hundreds of Chinese apps, increased its military presence along the border, and deepened security cooperation with the U.S., Japan, and Australia through the Quad. Neither India nor China has forgotten those events, and security calculations remain fundamentally cautious.
That’s exactly why the recent series of gestures is important: the resumption of direct flights and pilgrimage routes, easing of business visa processes, and intensification of high-level contacts (national security advisors, defense ministers, foreign ministers). Both sides have publicly committed that the border dispute will not paralyze broader relations. The existence of a political channel that reduces the risk of incidents in the Himalayas is valuable in itself, and combined with economic interest, it opens space for gradually lowering tensions.
Domestically, Prime Minister Modi frames this positioning through the lens of “strategic autonomy” and economic patriotism. Messages about promoting domestic production and protecting workers are presented as a response to external pressure. This reinforces the narrative of sovereignty in economic policy and a patient effort to build resilience. Within that framework, diversification of partners – including increasing Chinese imports of Indian goods and attracting investment – becomes a way to soften the blow of American tariffs.
The trade balance with China remains India’s biggest challenge. India has a chronic trade deficit with China of nearly $100 billion (!) and is looking for ways to reduce it. If Beijing opens its market further to sectors where India is competitive – pharmaceuticals, IT services, chemical industries, traditional goods – the political pressure on New Delhi would ease. At the same time, India is trying to “de-risk” its supply chains to reduce dependence on Chinese components, which requires a delicate balance: more trade and investment, but without new structural vulnerabilities.
The financial aspect is also changing. Increased use of local currencies and bilateral arrangements in trade of energy and goods is gradually lowering transaction costs linked to the dollar and exposure to secondary sanctions. For the Global South, this means more room to maneuver, and for India, it creates the possibility that a significant portion of energy imports will be less subject to political cycles in Washington. Combined with Russian discounts, this creates a new level of price and supply predictability.
Security consequences may occur on two levels. The first is local: reducing tensions at the Line of Actual Control, mechanisms for preventing incidents, and more transparent communications between commands. The second is regional: if New Delhi and Beijing enhance cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism, infrastructure, and climate policies within the SCO, the risk of accidental escalation is reduced. At the same time, the Quad will likely remain an important platform for India, but with a greater emphasis on public goods, supply chain resilience, and infrastructure projects – and less on overt balancing against China.
For the United States and its partners, this means a more complex task. A strategy of pressure through tariffs and secondary sanctions, intended to change India’s behavior toward Russia and China, has now come at a significant cost in trust. If India and China move closer even in limited, functional areas – trade, investment, energy – the effectiveness of an approach that relies on India taking sides is reduced. The multipolar reflex, fueled by the volatility of Western policy, gains further legitimacy.
Ultimately, Modi’s visit to China does not mean an alliance, but a shift in the framework through which India seeks maximum room for maneuver. In that process, BRICS ceases to be a relatively loose coordination and begins to take on characteristics of a more cohesive bloc: energy routes secured by Russian deliveries, financial channels increasingly bypassing the dollar, the Chinese market serving as a cushion against import shocks, and Indian industrial policy attempting to turn crisis into a stimulus for domestic production. If the Beijing meeting yields even modest progress – confidence-building at the border, easier trade, a signal of more stable investment – it will be a significant step toward consolidating a multipolar order.
If Modi’s visit confirms that direction, it could mark a turning point – not dramatic, but gradual and solid enough to change the balance of power in Asia and beyond over the long term.
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