The new U.S. “National Security Strategy” 2025: What the document actually says – a summary of key messages on Russia, the war in Ukraine, Europe, China, and the “end of the era of mass migration”
The new “National Security Strategy of the United States”, published in November 2025, is the first major doctrinal document of Trump’s second administration. In the introductory letter on pages 2–3, Trump claims that in “nine months” he brought America back from the brink of catastrophe—closed the borders, rebuilt the military with a one-trillion-dollar investment, forced NATO allies to increase spending from 2 to 5 percent of GDP, and launched Operation “Midnight Hammer”, which supposedly “wiped out” Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The document promises that “America First” will remain the framework for everything, but in a much more systematic form than in 2017.
The first chapter serves as a reckoning with the post-Cold War American elites. The strategy argues that after the Cold War they believed in permanent American dominance over the entire world and “tied” Washington to international institutions that erode sovereignty. Globalism, “fake free trade,” and the combination of an enormous welfare state and an expensive military apparatus—while letting American taxpayers shoulder the defense of allies—are described as failures that undermined American power itself.
But the answer to what the U.S. actually wants is twofold—survival as a sovereign republic and lasting supremacy. That means an emphasis on absolute control of borders and migration, protection from foreign influence (espionage, predatory trade practices, drugs, propaganda operations, “cultural subversion”), and military force—from the most powerful and technologically advanced military to the most robust nuclear deterrent and an ambitious missile shield, “Golden Dome,”for U.S. territory and allies. It also calls for reindustrialization, energy dominance in oil, gas, coal and nuclear power, technological leadership in science and “soft power,” as well as the restoration of the nation’s spiritual and cultural health, with an emphasis on traditional families and patriotism.
Looking outward, Washington defines five “vital” interests. In the Western Hemisphere, the goal is stability that prevents mass migration to the U.S., cooperation against cartels, preventing “non-hemispheric” powers from buying key infrastructure, and strengthening American control over strategic positions. All of this is framed as a new formula—Trump’s addendum to the Monroe Doctrine. In the Indo-Pacific, the aim is a free and open region, secure sea lanes, and resistance to economically harmful activities by “foreign actors” (a clear reference to China). In Europe, the goal is to help allies maintain security but also to restore civilizational self-awareness and Western identity. In the Middle East, the task is to prevent hostile powers from controlling oil and maritime chokepoints, but without new “forever wars.” Finally, the United States wants American technologies and standards in AI, biotechnology, and quantum computing to shape the global order.
The third chapter highlights America’s advantages—the world’s largest economy, the global reserve currency, the technology sector, the military, alliances, favorable geography, and “soft power.” This leads into the domestic agenda: eliminating “DEI” policies, deregulation and tax cuts, reindustrialization, and investment in new technologies. The strategy emphasizes that foreign policy cannot be separated from economic and cultural transformation within the U.S.
The key ideological framework is laid out in a list of “principles.” Trump’s approach is described as pragmatic but “anchored in U.S. interests.” A special emphasis is placed on “peace through strength”: the strongest economy, the most advanced technology, and the “healthiest culture” are considered prerequisites for deterring adversaries. A “preference for non-interventionism” is highlighted, though not an absolute rejection of intervention. “Realistic” cooperation with regimes that do not share the American political model is accepted, as long as they respect U.S. interests.
A special point is “the primacy of nations”—the document firmly rejects transnational projects that diminish state sovereignty and promises to defend American autonomy from international organizations, foreign lobbying, and the manipulation of migration to alter the demographic and political makeup of the U.S. At the same time, it insists on “fairness” in relations with partners: an end to “free-riding” in NATO and a demand that allies spend as much as 5% of GDP on defense, according to the so-called Hague commitment. The strategy is clearly pro-worker, but only within the American framework: a globalized labor force and the import of “talent” are criticized when they threaten domestic workers.
In the priorities section, the most radical formulation reads—“the era of mass migration is over.” The border is declared the foremost national security issue, and uncontrolled movement of people is described almost as an invasion. Parallel to this comes a reference to protecting fundamental freedoms of speech, religion, and political participation—especially in criticism of European governments and Western elites who allegedly impose “anti-democratic restrictions” under the pretext of fighting radicalism. Economic security is defined by a wide package—balanced trade, returning key supply chains to the U.S., major reindustrialization, strengthening the defense industry, energy dominance while openly rejecting “Net Zero,” and preserving the dominance of Wall Street and the dollar.
The regional chapters reveal how Washington imagines the distribution of power. In the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. wants to “reset” its military presence. More resources for the Coast Guard and Navy, targeted deployment of the military to the border and against cartels, even with the possibility of “lethal force.” At the same time, intensive economic diplomacy is planned. Encouraging manufacturing and supply chains in Latin America, but only on condition that strategic infrastructure and contracts be taken over by American companies supported by U.S. credit and development agencies. Foreign (primarily Chinese) presence is to be pushed back with the argument that their projects carry “hidden costs”—debt, cyber risks, espionage.
Asia and the Indo-Pacific are defined as the main economic and geopolitical arena of the 21st century. The document acknowledges that previous administrations erred in believing that integrating China into a “rules-based order” would automatically lead to political liberalization. The new goal is to rebalance relations—trade with China should be balanced and focused on “non-sensitive” sectors, while the U.S. and its allies organize into a kind of economic bloc that offers the “global south” an alternative to Chinese loans and infrastructure. The U.S. wants to leverage advantages in high tech, AI, defense, and financial markets to draw countries into its orbit.
The military dimension in Asia focuses on deterring war over Taiwan and preserving control over the first island chain and the South China Sea. The strategy announces strengthened U.S. naval and air presence but with a clear demand that Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan massively increase their own spending and allow greater access to their bases. The goal is “denial capability” against aggression anywhere in that region, in cooperation with all states that would suffer from Chinese control over key maritime routes.
The European chapter is titled “Promoting European Greatness,” but the tone is sharply critical. The EU and transnational institutions are accused of stifling political freedom and national sovereignty; migration policy is said to destabilize societies; and excessive regulation is blamed for suppressing innovation. The text also mentions demographic collapse and warns that some NATO members may soon become “majority non-European,” raising questions about the Alliance’s future cohesion.
Crucial from the perspective of Russia and the war in Ukraine: Washington proclaims as its “core interest” the rapid, negotiated end of the conflict. The aim is to stabilize European economies, prevent accidental escalation, restore “strategic stability with Russia,” and enable Ukraine to survive as a viable state. The strategy claims that most Europeans want peace, but that “unstable minority governments” maintain maximalist war aims through methods that undermine democracy. It also stresses that NATO must not remain a “permanently expansionary” organization. At the same time, it calls for a stronger Europe that will take responsibility for its own defense, especially in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, where Washington seeks to deepen economic and military ties.
In the Middle East, the emphasis is on “burden-shifting” and building peace. Since the U.S. is once again a net energy exporter, the region is no longer the gravitational center of American policy as before. Iran is described as weakened by Israeli actions and by the U.S. operation “Midnight Hammer,” while the Gaza war is said to have ended through Trump’s mediation and the release of all living hostages. The strategy sees an opportunity to turn the Middle East into an investment space—from nuclear energy to AI—by expanding the Abraham Accords and relying on regional partners, without long-term occupations or nation-building.
Africa is viewed almost exclusively through the prism of resources and geopolitical competition. Instead of traditional aid and the “spread of liberal ideology,” the U.S. wants to cooperate with “reliable and capable” states, invest in energy and critical minerals—including nuclear, gas, and LNG infrastructure—and avoid long-term military commitments. At the same time, the strategy notes the need to address and prevent conflicts such as those in the DRC, Sudan, or the Horn of Africa, but always with minimal American presence on the ground.
Overall, the strategy presents a vision of a United States that wants to withdraw from the ideological mission of “spreading democracy,” but not from its global role. On the contrary, Washington is trying to redefine hegemony through economic nationalization, strengthened controlled alliances, and more forceful burden-shifting to partners—from Europe to Asia and Latin America. The rhetoric of peaceful conflict resolution and “non-interventionism” stands alongside demands for higher military spending, expanded weapons industry, and firm intentions not to allow any serious challenger in the Western Hemisphere, in technological sectors, or in key maritime areas. How this will translate into concrete moves toward Russia, China, and Europe in the coming years remains an open question, but the direction is clearly set. America stays first—but wants the rest of the world increasingly to pay the price of that “order.”
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