While Washington and Moscow shape the outlines of peace, Europe is discovering that it is no longer at the table but out in the hallway — and is now desperately looking for a way back in
The geometry of the negotiations is no longer drawn as a triangle Washington–Brussels–Kyiv, but along a Washington–Moscow axis, with Europe standing aside. Both Russian and Western sources in recent days have sent the same signal — European capitals feel pushed out of the game, and the Kremlin appears convinced that this is for the best.
A leaked record of a recent call between Macron, Merz, Stubb, Rutte and others with Volodymyr Zelensky shows the deep distrust European leaders have toward the American initiative: they speak of a possible “betrayal” of Ukraine regarding territory, of Americans “playing games” with both Kyiv and the Europeans, while the Finnish president resignedly admits they are “currently out, but must get back in.” The very fact that such lines are being spoken shows how aware Europe is that decisive talks are being held without it.
Russia’s chief negotiator Kirill Dmitriev publicly tells Chancellor Merz that he is “not in the game at all” and accuses him of warmongering, sabotaging peace, and stubbornness. A similar line is echoed by Putin’s adviser Yuri Ushakov. According to him, Brussels excluded itself from the process by refusing any serious contacts with Moscow and by insisting on using Ukraine as a means to achieve a “historic defeat” of Russia.
At the same time, the U.S.–Russian channel seems to be running at high speed. Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were in Moscow, held five hours of talks with Putin, discussed the American ceasefire proposal — largely based on a Russian document and then revised after Kyiv’s objections. Europe is absent at this stage — it is only afterwards trying to insert some “European component,” offering its own versions of a plan that the Kremlin rejects as completely unacceptable.
Why does Moscow believe it does not need Europe for peace? First, because from the very beginning Europe’s policy toward Ukraine was maximalist in the style of “not an inch of territory,” “victory on the battlefield,” and a refusal to hold any real discussion about compromise. Second, because European governments in recent years have themselves admitted that they used previous agreements (Minsk) merely as a cover for arming Kyiv (!), not for achieving peace. Third, because Brussels openly refuses direct dialogue with Russia. It is no surprise, then, that Moscow says — if you don’t want to talk, you won’t participate.
One must also add the dimension of Europe’s moral panic. German Defense Minister Pistorius warns from Berlin that an “imposed peace” would be a catastrophe for European security, while Merz writes in the newspapers that Europe “must not let others decide what will happen with our security and with frozen Russian assets.” Translated, this means that if the U.S. and Russia reach an agreement, the European elite fears being faced with a fait accompli, forced to accept the consequences of someone else’s deal.
But is Russia’s belief that Europe is truly “out” of the negotiations perhaps naïve? Even if it formally lacks a seat at the main table, the European bloc has two instruments with which it can undermine any U.S.–Russian deal: money and sanctions. The EU is the main funder of the Ukrainian state, the key source of macro-financial aid and logistics, and the center of the sanctions regime hitting Russian trade and finance. If Brussels decides to continue the war through a “frozen” peace, refuse to recognize new borders, and keep sanctions regardless of a Washington–Moscow deal, then peace remains fragile, partial, and full of toxic leftovers.
Furthermore, the transatlantic link may be creaking, but it has not snapped. Whatever Trump and his people say at campaign rallies about “America First” and “tired Europeans,” in practice the U.S. still supports Ukraine — militarily, intelligence-wise, financially, and diplomatically. It is still Washington that sends weapons, approves aid packages, keeps Ukraine’s budget on life support, and sends envoys to Moscow. The very fact that Europe is now panicking about a possible American “betrayal” reveals who the real tutor of Ukrainian policy is — and why it is unrealistic to believe the U.S. will suddenly stop considering European interests, however often it may ignore them.
Historically, every attempt at rapprochement between Washington and Moscow has been accompanied by resistance from part of the Euro-Atlantic establishment, often precisely the segment based in Europe. Today we are witnessing a new version of this same pattern. While the Trump administration tests the possibility of a deal with Russia, part of the European elite and NATO bureaucracy calls for continuing the war “as long as necessary,” speaks of the “catastrophe of an imposed peace,” and prepares a political-legal arsenal (from new sanctions to courts and tribunals) to constrain any potential compromise. Europe may not be at the table, but it is certainly preparing to react to whatever is agreed there.
At the same time, Europe’s ability to sabotage someone else’s agreement is weaker today than a decade ago. The continent has entered an open energy and industrial crisis after cutting off Russian energy supplies. Deindustrialization, rising prices, and social dissatisfaction erode the legitimacy of governments calling for a “long war.” Public enthusiasm for the war is fading, elections are bringing gains for Eurosceptic and anti-establishment forces, and some member states openly advocate a different approach to Russia. Under such conditions, it will become increasingly difficult for Brussels to endlessly undermine a deal between two nuclear superpowers.
From the perspective of societies that do not want to live in a state of permanent mobilization and Cold War hysteria, the most rational way out is precisely what the European elite fears most: a direct agreement between Washington and Moscow, with possible participation from Kyiv but without European moralizing or maximalist conditions. Not because the U.S. would be a noble peacemaker (far from it), but because only an agreement between the two main centers of power can halt the spiral of escalation and open space for a realistic compromise — not fantasies about the strategic defeat of a nuclear power.
So far, Europe has shown one “consistency,” in that it has never demonstrated serious interest in peace under conditions even remotely acceptable to all sides. Instead of seeking a way out, it chose the role of NATO’s most hawkish wing. Perhaps this is why, for the process of ending the war, it really is better that it stays outside the room — and then only later confronts the consequences of someone else’s agreement and its own miscalculations.
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