Seven Trump points, then a five-point European counterproposal, then America’s 28, now Ukraine’s new 20… but most are simply buying time and positioning for the endgam
As the war in Ukraine approaches its fourth anniversary, diplomacy (for some time now) has been entering a new phase. After a draft peace agreement arrived from Washington under Trump’s sponsorship, Kyiv is now presenting its own version. A 20-point peace framework that President Zelensky describes as the Ukrainian plan. At the time of writing, the new EU leaders’ meeting scheduled for today has not yet taken place, but preparations are underway. Even before it begins, the topic is predictable: Europe is still looking for a way to support Kyiv without accepting the most controversial elements of the American proposal or openly clashing with the administration in Washington.
We now have a whole collection of “point-by-point” plans, and they are becoming difficult to track, but let’s go in order.
Originally, the story began with a seven-point American plan this spring. That document, drafted in Trump’s circle, envisioned an immediate ceasefire, Ukraine’s formal abandonment of NATO membership, recognition of Russian control over Crimea and part of Donbas, and gradual lifting of sanctions on Moscow, along with renewed U.S.–Russian cooperation in energy and industry. In Kyiv and much of Europe, that draft was seen as completely unacceptable.
Kyiv and European capitals quickly tried to regain the initiative. In cooperation with key EU states, a five-point counterplan was drafted: a full, unconditional ceasefire under international supervision, strong security guarantees for Ukraine without limiting its military capabilities, and the return of all deported civilians and prisoners of war. The most sensitive issue—territory—was deliberately pushed into the future. The starting point for negotiations would be the then-current frontline positions, but without formal recognition of the Russian annexations.
During weeks of intensive consultations, the U.S. draft expanded to 28 points, then was trimmed again. Zelensky publicly stated that the non-Ukrainian points were removed and that the working document had been reduced to 20 items that Kyiv now considers an acceptable basis. In this 20-point framework, the key principles were retained—confirmation of Ukrainian sovereignty, a ceasefire on land, sea and air under supervision of major powers, but without any pre-agreed territorial concessions. Crimea, Donbas and other disputed areas would become subjects of separate political negotiations only after the guns fall silent.
Security guarantees take center stage in this new plan. Kyiv wants something that, in effect if not in formal structure, resembles NATO’s Article 5—an obligation for a group of countries to respond if Russia violates the peace or attacks again. Since there is currently no consensus for Ukraine’s formal entry into NATO, talk revolves around a “coalition of the willing,” a group of Western states that would commit to long-term military and financial support, and possibly even an observer or protection mission on the ground (which Moscow would almost certainly reject). In parallel, a reconstruction plan for Ukraine would run, partly financed by frozen Russian assets, while sanctions on Moscow would be relaxed only if it proves it is honoring the agreement—with a rapid “snap-back” mechanism in case of violations.
With this proposal, Zelensky is sending several messages at once. To the outside world he shows that Ukraine is “not blocking peace,” but offering its own version of compromise that does not amount to capitulation. To the U.S. administration he offers a document they can work with, one that removes the harshest demands of Trump’s first draft. Simultaneously, he signals to the domestic public that he is not giving up a single piece of territory. Ukraine’s constitution is based on the 1991 borders, and Zelensky repeatedly states he has “no right” to sign anything contrary. His readiness—at least rhetorically—to open the topic of elections during wartime fits into this context, aiming to neutralize Trump’s claims that he is using the war to stay in power.
On the other side of the table, Moscow views these moves coldly but confidently. The initial American draft was very favorable for them: a ceasefire allowing Russia to keep most of the captured territories, Ukraine abandoning NATO, and the prospect of gradually returning to “normal” economic cooperation with the West. Putin and Russian officials watch with some satisfaction, but growing skepticism, as the negotiating text changes—but the key Russian demand remains unchanged: recognition of Russian authority over Crimea and all of Donbas, along with legalization of the annexations. Meanwhile, the Russian military continues offensives and airstrikes, trying to further improve its starting position for any potential ceasefire.
Here lies a gap that no diplomatic language currently bridges. For Ukraine, formal territorial concessions are politically almost unthinkable—Zelensky still says so. For Russia, withdrawing to the 2022 or 2014 lines would be perceived as a defeat and an admission that the war failed to achieve its goals. The result is a classic wartime deadlock: both sides claim they want peace, but on terms the other cannot accept.
Within this framework, the European Union is trying to play a cushioning role. British, French and German leaders, along with several others, have been working in recent days to strengthen Zelensky’s position before he faces Trump’s team again. The message from London, Paris, Berlin and Brussels remains the same: Europe stands by Ukraine, rejects Trump’s public attacks on Kyiv, and insists on a “just and lasting” peace, not a quick deal that would “reward aggression.” Ahead of the new European meeting, EU capitals are coordinating positions on security guarantees and the use of frozen Russian assets, aware that they must hold the line while the U.S. pushes toward a compromise more favorable to Washington.
Behind the firm statements, however, lies a resigned calculation. European governments increasingly see that a war of this intensity is not sustainable long-term, especially if U.S. military aid continues to shrink. Thus part of the EU is accelerating its own arms packages and financial support, but at the same time—though they hide it publicly—many quietly hope Trump will soften his rhetoric and accept the modified peace framework Kyiv is offering. Europe still stands firmly with Ukraine, but few truly believe it can indefinitely compensate for America’s retreat.
The very fact that Zelensky is presenting a new peace plan is also a formal rejection of Trump’s first draft. This is a legitimate strategy from Kyiv’s perspective. Instead of an outright “no” to the U.S. president, Kyiv presents “its own” document, signaling it seeks an end to the conflict through compromise, but not via a one-sided capitulation. Yet one key illusion remains: the goal of negotiations is not to satisfy Trump, but to reach something Vladimir Putin will also accept.
Meanwhile, peace plans continue to accumulate. Ukraine’s earlier “peace formula,” the Chinese proposal, Turkish initiatives, now the American, the European-Ukrainian, and Kyiv’s new 20-point framework—all are effectively on the table. All speak of a ceasefire, prisoner exchange, reconstruction, and guarantees the war won’t resume. But none resolves the issue blocking everything: the fate of the large swath of territory that today—regardless of international law—remains under de facto Russian control.
As painful as it is for Kyiv and its European backers, it is hard to imagine peace without accepting that this territorial status quo is unlikely to change dramatically. Ukraine will, understandably, continue to formally insist on its 1991 borders; Russia on its annexations; and diplomats will invent various “temporary regimes” and postponed negotiations. But behind the paperwork lies a simple reality—whoever is stronger on the ground today will shape where the border actually runs tomorrow. The new Kyiv peace plan is an attempt to translate that reality into the most diplomatically acceptable language possible. Whether it will be enough to finally stop the war, or just another document in a growing pile, will become clear in the days, weeks and months ahead.
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