What will happen to the continent when the entire center collapses? What will remain on the political scene after them?
If the political center in Europe truly collapses… What then? What kind of Europe are we left with? Given the course of events, some general trends, and, to be honest, what people are saying among themselves, such a scenario is realistic. Of course, it probably won’t happen in one dramatic moment but through a series of elections and crises that are already unfolding before our eyes. In a number of countries, voters are increasingly losing faith in the parties that have built the “European project” for decades and guaranteed stability, while they are more willing to take risks with those promising radical change (this story is partly inspired by yesterday’s elections in Chile, but the European dimension is even more complex, potentially more uncomfortable). The current situation is not yet collapse, but it is unstable enough that we can seriously imagine tomorrow’s Europe in which the center no longer has a real majority and in which political life is determined by those who were until recently on the margins.
In France, this is seen almost caricaturally. The president who arrived as the embodiment of a new center, with the promise of breaking the old left-right divide, is now entangled in permanent parliamentary deadlock and historically low ratings. His departure will likely leave a political landscape where the main figures are new forces of a harsher right, while traditional parties are barely recognizable. In Germany, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats still formally govern, but with barely enough majority and under constant pressure from both sides of the spectrum. The Alternative for Germany is recording its best results in history; part of the security apparatus openly considers it a “threat to democracy,” yet it is becoming a normalized option for a large portion of voters. In the Netherlands, centrists manage to defeat radical populists for one term, but the difference is thin, and no one believes politics will return to the old balance. In Britain, after a brief triumph of the left center, a new right-wing populist formation already threatens to shatter both Labour and Conservatives, while from the left edge an “ecological left” awakens that openly defines itself as populist. In Italy, the center has already collapsed, and a hard right is in power that, at least for now, has adapted to the realities of Brussels and the market, but has permanently changed the political norm. In Romania, a centrist candidate narrowly managed to halt the rise of the right, which delayed rather than resolved the question of where the country is headed. In fact, Romania is an ideal example for this story because it shows that the center somewhere “survives,” even now, only thanks to highly dubious operations. Namely, the right-wing favorite, Georgescu, was simply disqualified by the constitutional court when he started speaking against NATO and support for the war in Ukraine!
In all these examples, the common motif is that democracy is no longer favorable to the center. Not because voters have suddenly become enemies of moderation, but because in their eyes the center has stopped solving concrete problems. For years, the explosion of living costs, regional inequalities, erosion of public services, and insecurity in the labor market have been ignored. At the same time, migration policy has been conducted in half-spoken compromises that actually satisfied neither those fearing uncontrolled arrivals nor those wanting a more humane approach. Migration has precisely shown “what the center is.” A policy that cares neither for natives nor foreigners. People were massively “imported” through, for example, the “open doors” policy of former Chancellor Merkel, and claims of humanitarianism were just a cover to provide cheaper labor to big capital (and labor in general—because Europe, especially Germany, still chronically lacks workers).
In such a scenario of center collapse, Europe in the near future could look like a continent of permanent campaigning, with governments changing every year or two, or even months, often without a clear majority and with coalitions linking otherwise incompatible actors. Political institutions would still exist, budgets would be passed, foreign policy conducted, but everything under constant blackmail from partners threatening to leave the coalition, under the weight of street protests and permanent “culture wars.” National parliaments would become stages for performances (in most cases they already are), and less places for real agreement. The European Parliament and Brussels institutions would remain a large machine of administration and regulation, but the political majority in them would be fractured between different blocs, from sovereigntists to climate maximalists, with little room for compromise.
It must be clearly stated that today there is significantly more energy on the far right than on the far left. Theoretically, the collapse of the center could strengthen radical left as well, but in most European countries it fails to capitalize on dissatisfaction at the level the right does. Radical left often remains tied to urban, educated, and relatively privileged layers that are vocal but numerically limited. In the internal political dynamics of the EU, therefore, an increasingly visible struggle is between a tired, compromised middle and a confident nationalist right, while leftist alternatives remain fragmented and without a coherent strategy.
The economic implications of such a shift would be profound. For decades, Europe has sold the world an image of a space of stability and predictability, where one invests with reasonable rules and relatively low political uncertainty. If in key countries governments line up threatening exit from the eurozone, cancellation of agreements (say, climate ones), introduction of drastic tariffs, or abandonment of common defense policy, capital starts seeking safer havens. Moreover, if radical right rhetoric further fuels social tensions and occasional outbursts of violence, wealthier and more mobile layers of society could literally start leaving individual countries, either by moving within Europe or departing to other parts of the world. The biggest losers would be those who remain, in societies that are simultaneously politically nervous and economically less competitive (vicious cycles).
The social effects of center collapse are equally important. Europe already shows signs of deep polarization between metropolises and provinces, between cosmopolitan middle classes and working communities feeling forgotten. If the center continues to lose, that divide could turn into two almost separate countries within each state. In cities, progressive norms, multicultural policies, and some version of liberal democracy would persist, though increasingly under pressure, while smaller towns and villages would become political strongholds of movements openly speaking of civilizational conflict, ethnic quotas, and returning society to some imagined past. Media would still operate in centers of power, large institutions would continue communicating their language of political correctness and technocratic solutions, but a good portion of voters would no longer receive or understand that language at all. Instead of a common public space, we would have parallel information worlds, where the same event means two completely different things (if we look around a bit, in recent months or a year, this is already happening to us—there is hardly a topic without two interpretations).
A special dimension of this story is certainly the war in Europe, or rather in Ukraine. The irony is that for the political center, if it wants to survive, the quickest end to the conflict would suit best. Every month of war feeds the radical right’s narrative that elites are incapable, playing with others’ lives, and sacrificing European security for illusory geopolitical goals. The hard left thinks almost the same, but it is currently weak because its voter base is still tied to the liberal center from which it learned to live. In other words, only when the center collapses underfoot can the harder left expect a sudden surge in supporters.
The center, instead of seeking an exit, in many countries competes over who will send more weapons and fewer diplomatic proposals. This is both morally and politically risky, because every new wave of mobilization, sanctions, and military incidents deepens fatigue and anger in societies already feeling the burden of inflation, energy shocks, and uncertainty. In a hypothetical scenario where the war drags on for years (it seems to be ending, but… that end just won’t come), it is hard to imagine voters remaining loyal to the same parties that led them into that state, especially if internal social crises pile up in parallel.
On a human level, cynicism is almost inevitable. It is clear that many of today’s center leaders will personally be well protected from the consequences of their own decisions! If the situation truly escalates, they will know how to retreat to safer harbors, international institutions, private consulting jobs, investments, and villas far from cities where the real impact of austerity, unemployment, or rising crime won’t be felt. In contrast, ordinary people, especially those in poorer neighborhoods and regions already sacrificed once in transition and globalization, will remain stuck in chaos they did not decide on but will have to endure.
Some “cunning” center parties are already preparing for the potentially inevitable by pumping right-wing rhetoric so that in the moment of continental collapse they can (try to) say—hey, we are that new right-wing force you want, look how nicely we’ve radicalized. Fascinatingly, some will even succeed.
All this said does not mean the center’s collapse is necessary or that Europe cannot find a new form of moderate politics. But it is an illusion to claim the current center is a guarantor of stability. It might have been if it had timely seriously addressed issues of inequality, migration, regional differences, and war escalation, instead of often acting as a vertical ideology of political correctness descending from above and expecting obedience. If nothing significant changes, the scenario of a Europe where the far right becomes one of the main forces, and democratic institutions live under constant tension, is not a utopian novel but a real option.
Indicators persistently show the same picture, from France to Romania and from the Netherlands to Italy, and it says trust in the center is melting faster than the center manages to understand why! If Europe wants to avoid the worst versions of what we’ve described here, it will have to return to something paradoxically simple and extremely difficult: politics that does not start from ideological slogans and geopolitical ambitions, but from the real lives of people. If that does not happen, tomorrow’s Europe will be less stable, less just, and more embittered, and the center convinced it is defending democracy may wake up to realize it was actually holding the ladder for those coming into its vacuum.
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