Could history—or rather, the present—have turned out differently? And how did Ukraine, under U.S. pressure, lose the most powerful weapon it had?
On December 25, 1991, for the last time, the Soviet flag was lowered over the Kremlin and replaced by a new one—that of Russia. On the same day, the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, resigned. Of course, this historical shift didn’t happen overnight. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall (November 9, 1989), it had become clear to many that this was the end not only of the USSR but also of the entire Eastern socialist bloc (soon to be followed by wars in Yugoslavia).
After the collapse of the USSR, the world map gained 15 new independent countries. How did they react? How did they cope? Differently, of course—it was a time of great unpredictability but also optimism, especially among those who had most hoped for the Soviet Union’s dissolution (particularly in the western republics like the Baltic states).
What about Ukraine?
Were Ukrainians happy that the USSR had collapsed? Oh yes, the vast majority were. But that euphoria was very short-lived. In a relatively brief period, Ukraine became the poorest country in Europe. Its economy collapsed, literally halving within five years. Unemployment exploded. Take this as an example—today we’re worried about inflation at around 10%, but in Ukraine in 1993, inflation reached 4,734.91% (!).
Clearly, time alters perception. In the 1991 independence referendum, a massive 92.3% voted for independence, to leave the USSR. But after economic hardship, a significant portion became nostalgic for Soviet times—at least economically. For instance, a 2018 poll showed that 47% of Ukrainians viewed the Brezhnev era (1960s and ’70s) positively.
Indeed, despite past hardships like World War II and the Holodomor in the 1930s, life in Ukraine during the ’70s and ’80s was relatively good. Jobs were secure, healthcare and education were provided by the state—it was in many ways similar to life in Yugoslavia (though Yugoslavia enjoyed added advantages due to its non-aligned status).
After the USSR’s dissolution, Russia became the official successor to the failed state, inheriting, among other things, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. But the breakup—which didn’t happen literally overnight, but was still relatively fast and chaotic—left much Soviet weaponry behind in Ukraine, including the most destructive kind: nuclear weapons. In fact, Ukraine briefly became the third largest nuclear power in the world based on its nuclear arsenal!
Today, as we know, Ukraine no longer has nuclear weapons—though many wish it had turned out differently. The big question: Would Russia have attacked Ukraine if it were still a nuclear power? Opinions vary. On one hand, no nuclear power has been attacked outright (excluding border skirmishes like India vs. Pakistan or India vs. China). Many cite North Korea as an example—a country clearly protected by its nuclear arsenal from potential U.S. aggression (unlike Libya, for example, which became a target in 2011 after disarming).
So what happened to Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal?
Was it really voluntarily handed over to Russia?
Let’s return to the beginning of independent Ukraine. Its first president was Leonid Kravchuk (who died recently on May 10 at age 88). He served from 1991 to 1994. His term began optimistically, just like Ukraine itself—but soon turned tense. The GDP was in freefall and by 1994 had plunged 40%. His Prime Minister, Leonid Kuchma, resigned. A political crisis followed, and Kravchuk himself stepped down, only to run again and be defeated by Kuchma.
Interestingly, Kravchuk, early in his presidency, expressed interest in Ukraine joining NATO and was strongly opposed to joining any Eurasian military alliances (which were clearly under Moscow’s control).
But the key moment came with the signing of the Lisbon Protocol on May 23, 1992. What was it? A document through which the former Soviet republics agreed to give up their nuclear weapons. After the USSR’s breakup, most nuclear arms remained in Russia, but some were deployed across three former Soviet republics—Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.
About 17% of the Soviet nuclear arsenal was located in Ukraine at the time. Russia and the U.S. had signed the START Treaty in 1991 (on nuclear arms reduction), and the Lisbon Protocol was an extension of that agreement. Under it, the three states committed to non-proliferation, to ratify the treaty as soon as possible, and to dismantle their nuclear arsenals. Signatories included Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, as well as Russia’s Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.
However, Ukraine’s parliament still needed to ratify it—and that didn’t go smoothly. There was strong resistance.
Understandably so. Ukrainian officials were already observing regional instability—ethnic conflicts had started in South Ossetia (1991) and in Transnistria (neighboring Moldova). Talks with Russia over the Black Sea Fleet based in Crimea collapsed in January 1992. Moreover, Russian officials started questioning the 1954 Soviet decision (made under Khrushchev) that transferred Crimea to Ukraine.
The Lisbon Protocol was only ratified in late 1993, when the Budapest Memorandum was already in preparation.
Interestingly, from today’s perspective, the U.S. strongly pushed for Ukraine to give up its nuclear arms, and Kravchuk agreed to the Lisbon Protocol after meeting President George H. W. Bush in the U.S. on May 6, 1992. In return, the U.S. provided Ukraine with a $110 million credit to buy American goods.
How long did it take Ukraine to fully dismantle its nuclear arsenal and infrastructure (e.g., missile silos)? A long time—not until 2001 was the process complete.
Most importantly, we must mention the Budapest Memorandum, signed on December 5, 1994. Ukraine wasn’t going to give up nuclear weapons for a $100 million loan—it needed much more: security guarantees.
That was the purpose of the Budapest Memorandum. It was signed by three nuclear powers—Russia, the U.S., and the U.K.—with Ukraine (with identical versions signed with Belarus and Kazakhstan). The three pledged not to use military or economic pressure against Ukraine, Belarus, or Kazakhstan, “except in self-defense or as consistent with the UN Charter.” France and China also gave weaker guarantees under the agreement.
Did Russia violate the Budapest Memorandum?
Most would agree—yes. Not only now, but already in 2014 when it took over Crimea.
We can only speculate “what if” Ukraine had kept its nuclear weapons. While history shows nuclear states tend not to be attacked, it also shows how close the U.S. and USSR came to nuclear war on multiple occasions.
But without U.S. pressure on Kyiv, Ukraine might have kept nuclear weapons. Resistance in Kyiv was real, as revealed years later.
On January 14, 1994, the presidents of the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine were to sign a trilateral non-proliferation agreement in Moscow. U.S. President Bill Clinton arrived two days early in Kyiv, only to be met with an unpleasant surprise—Ukrainians told him they had changed their minds and would not sign. Clinton then directly threatened Kravchuk, saying further hesitation would have “very serious consequences for U.S.-Ukrainian relations.” In other words, he crushed Ukrainian resistance with pressure.
Ukraine tried other ways to retain at least part of its arsenal—proposing to keep a small portion, or even to surrender it all but not announce it publicly to avoid domestic backlash—but those proposals were rejected.
And so Ukraine, once the third-largest nuclear military power in the world, became non-nuclear. Today, as it loses territory in the east and south, Kyiv surely reflects on those days. Maybe history—and the present—could have been very different. Or maybe that alternate timeline would have only accelerated a global catastrophe we’re still hoping to avoid.
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