Ukraine and Romania reflect on what comes next—and who poses a greater threat to whom
In recent days, Romania has been mentioned more frequently in connection with the war in Ukraine, particularly as Ukrainian river ports on the Danube—located right along the Romanian border—have come back into focus, and following reports that parts of Russian drones allegedly fell on Romanian territory. Ukraine was infuriated when Bucharest initially denied that Russian drones had crashed on Romanian soil—possibly because Ukraine hoped to escalate the conflict to a NATO level, since Romania is a member of the alliance. However, in recent days Bucharest appears to have confirmed that drone debris was indeed found and most likely originates from Russia.
Why is Bucharest “changing its story”? Perhaps due to pressure, but it remains to be seen whether this situation will escalate further.
In the meantime, this is an ideal moment to revisit the history of Romania and Ukraine—and their relationship, which has often been strained.
Official diplomatic relations between Bucharest and Kyiv were re-established in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, border disputes significantly damaged relations and led to considerable animosity between the two countries. The key dispute was over one of the few islands in the Black Sea—Snake Island. The issue was ultimately resolved through arbitration in The Hague in 2009, which ruled the island belonged to Ukraine. Naturally, Romania did not accept this verdict lightly. In addition, there are other territorial disputes over exclusive economic zones and rights to resources in and under the Black Sea.
It’s fair to say that relations between Romania and Ukraine after the USSR’s collapse continued a legacy of mutual distrust that dates back through much of the 20th century.
Interestingly, Romania strongly supported Ukraine for many years in its efforts to join Euro-Atlantic structures—particularly NATO. However, Bucharest was always wary of ending up in exactly the situation it now faces: a war right on its border (Romania is now even building shelters for its population along the Ukrainian border).
At the same time, the idea of a “Greater Romania”—a concept envisioning all ethnic Romanians living in one state—has never been fully abandoned in Romania. To realize that idea, parts of Ukraine would have to be annexed, not to mention Moldova, which many Romanians consider practically their own.
Since the breakup of the USSR and the birth of an independent Ukraine, Romanian politicians have repeatedly questioned the legality of the 1940 Soviet-Romanian border changes, through which Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and Snake Island—territories once part of the Kingdom of Romania—became part of the USSR.
Although Romania has signed numerous international agreements confirming post-WWII borders in Europe, ideas of reintegrating “all ethnic Romanian territories” remain popular in media and political discourse. These unionist sentiments have even been echoed by former Romanian President Traian Băsescu, who accused Kyiv of wanting to reintegrate Transnistria and once proposed a territory swap—Transnistria for Northern Bukovina.
Such statements by Romanian politicians are, unsurprisingly, seen in Ukraine as territorial ambitions. In this context, Romania’s significant support for ethnic Romanians living in Ukraine is also viewed as a soft-power attempt to implement the “Greater Romania” vision by culturally and linguistically integrating border regions.
According to pre-war census data, Romania had about 61,000 ethnic Ukrainians, while Ukraine had around 151,000 ethnic Romanians. In both cases, these national minorities made up about 0.3% of each country’s population. However, Romania and Ukraine disagree on the status of the Moldovan minority in Ukraine. Kyiv considers Moldovans a distinct ethnic group, while Bucharest claims they are “Bessarabian Romanians,” merging the two minorities in its official statistics and thereby asserting that over 400,000 ethnic Romanians live in Ukraine.
Bucharest argues that Kyiv is trying to “deromanize” the Romanian community in Ukraine. Tensions escalated in 2008, prompting Romania to withdraw from the Romanian-Ukrainian Intergovernmental Commission on National Minorities, a body that—along with experts from the OSCE and Council of Europe—monitored minority-populated areas in both countries.
Conversely, Kyiv accuses Romania of poor and “asymmetrical treatment” of its Ukrainian minority. According to Ukrainian government calculations, Romanians in Ukraine enjoy better-developed systems of primary, secondary, and higher education in their native language, access to a wider range of regional TV and radio programming, and more print media in Romanian.
Another major point of contention in Romanian-Ukrainian economic relations is the Ukrainian development of the deep-water navigation route Danube–Black Sea through the Bystroye Canal in the Ukrainian part of the Danube Delta. The goal is to boost competitiveness and increase cargo volumes through Ukrainian ports like Izmail and Reni. However, Romania objected to the project, arguing that Ukraine violated international environmental standards. It’s a familiar pattern—countries often invoke “ecology” when their real motives lie elsewhere. This was likely the case with Romania too. At the same time, Bucharest was developing its own competing routes—the Sulina and Sfântu Gheorghe branches.
According to Ukrainian politicians and experts (before the war), Romania is trying to deny Ukraine access to its own route and block its development to secure a transport monopoly in the Danube Delta. In this context, one wonders what Romanian politicians privately think about the current Russian airstrikes on Ukrainian Danube ports.
From Transnistria, national minorities, control of the Black Sea, to Danube ports—these are some of the main fault lines in the relationship between Bucharest and Kyiv. Of course, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has significantly shifted these dynamics, and now Romania—as an EU and NATO member—is expected to fully support Ukraine, much like Poland does. Bucharest will do what is expected, at least most of it, but they are also aware that this war will eventually end and some old disputes may resurface. On the other hand, they also know that war can always escalate—and in such moments, everything changes drastically, including borders.
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