China’s goal is to become a global leader by 2049—not just economically, but also in terms of technology, military power, and cultural influence. However, the actions of U.S. President Donald Trump have awakened a sense of urgency in Beijing to accelerate this plan. Simultaneously, the question has emerged: should this goal be achieved with Xi Jinping at the helm—or without him? Xi appears intent on playing the long game, betting on global trends aligning with China’s interests. But not everyone in Beijing shares his patience.
A few weeks ago, Xi gave a speech in which he outlined, more or less, China’s future political trajectory. “Empires fall when they forget the reason for their birth,” Xi said, alluding to China’s ambition to usher in a new, much longer cycle of imperial history.
To support his point, the communist leader cited Spain—whose empire rose after the discovery of the Americas, but fell once there were no more lands to colonize or gold mines to exploit. He also pointed to the French empire, which was based on conquests and fell when Paris lost the means to expand. The British Empire lasted the longest in modern times—from the defeat of the Spanish Armada in the late 16th century to the handover of Hong Kong in 1997.
This historical reflection served as a prelude to what could be seen as a eulogy for today’s global empire—the United States: “In less than a century, the American empire is showing visible signs of fatigue, internal instability, political polarization, and a crisis of trust. Americans have forgotten why they became an empire.”
Noticeable changes in state-controlled Chinese media reporting, Xi’s disappearances from public life, his absence from the BRICS summit, and a series of dismissals or mysterious disappearances of officials once seen as Xi loyalists have sparked speculation about a possible leadership change in China.
Xi and Chinese propaganda are increasingly emphasizing China as a civilization rather than an empire—a civilization meant to endure, not dominate. In practice, this means exporting infrastructure rather than ideology, signing deals rather than installing puppet governments. China offers stability over democracy and order over rights and freedoms. While appearing respectful upon entering new markets, Chinese interests quickly take root to protect investments—gradually increasing influence at the expense of local authorities.
Another axis of Chinese propaganda is aimed at Europe and the EU, pushing the narrative that NATO is no longer a reliable guarantor of continental stability, undermined by its founder and main stakeholder—the U.S. Simultaneously, China positions itself as Europe’s key future partner, saying: “We are here. Over the past 5,000 years, we’ve learned not to rush—because time is on our side.” Although, demographically speaking, time may not be on China’s side.
THE OTHER FACE OF CHINA
Chinese economist Gao Shanwen disappeared from public life after releasing data contradicting official government reports. Gao claimed GDP growth was just over 2%, not the 5% stated by Beijing. He also said youth unemployment was around 40%, compared to the official 17%.
China has long tried to present a better image than reality—highlighting achievements while concealing flaws.
China’s four major internal challenges are:
- Demographic decline
- Extremely high youth unemployment
- Weak domestic consumption
- Heavy dependence on exports to Europe and the U.S.
The demographic crisis is the most significant internal threat. Aging and a shrinking population could derail China’s ambitions to become the world’s leading power. For three years in a row, China has seen a population decline, with 2023 marking a sharp drop in births. From 2016 to 2023, the number of newborns halved—from 18.8 million to 9.5 million. If nothing changes, China’s population could be halved by the end of this century.
Beijing is now offering monthly subsidies for each child (including the first) up to age three, in addition to existing local incentives. However, the problem isn’t just money. Despite better living standards than ever, cultural and societal shifts are discouraging larger families. Urbanization, women’s emancipation, changing lifestyles in megacities, and shifting youth aspirations run counter to Beijing’s geopolitical goals. Even marriage rates have sharply declined in the past decade.
CHINA WANTS TO AVOID THE USSR’S MISTAKES
Much of China’s foreign and economic policy is based on lessons from the Soviet Union’s collapse during the Cold War.
Xi believes China must not repeat the USSR’s mistakes—especially economically. The USSR collapsed due to economic failure, not political instability. The Soviets prioritized heavy industry and weaponry, which led to isolation. China is taking the opposite route: developing all sectors, especially new technologies, to withstand U.S. pressure and remain the top trading partner for many nations. Currently, China is the main trading partner for 60 countries—twice as many as the U.S.
Another lesson: avoid geopolitical isolation. Beijing promotes a multipolar world, where countries don’t have to choose a single superpower to align with. China portrays the West as in decline, with the U.S. as the main source of instability.
A third lesson is preventing the U.S. from turning Russia against China, as it once exploited the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Thus, Beijing will continue supporting Moscow—even when it disagrees—because a Russian defeat in Ukraine would empower Europe and the U.S., weakening China’s global stance.
A fourth lesson: avoid an arms race with the U.S. at all costs—it’s a race China cannot win.
Finally, Xi insists on centralized power and party control in all aspects of life, believing the USSR collapsed when its Communist Party lost grip on society.
CHINA’S ENERGY DEPENDENCE
Diversification is the keyword in Beijing. Wars in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have been problematic for China but also educational. If Trump continues making foreign policy errors, China could turn them into strategic advantages in the Indo-Pacific—possibly even leading to an invasion of Taiwan.
China was among the main beneficiaries of the brief Iran-Israel war. Almost half of China’s energy imports come from the Persian Gulf, through the Strait of Hormuz. A prolonged conflict or a blocked Hormuz would be devastating for China’s economic growth.
While Russia has become a major oil and gas supplier to China since the Ukraine invasion, China’s needs are so massive that it still relies heavily on Gulf oil. However, China does not want to depend too much on Russia, especially in such a strategic sector, to maintain dominance in the relationship.
With the Silk Road through Russia and Ukraine disrupted, China has shifted focus to Central Asia and the Middle East. It has increased cooperation with Saudi Arabia in high-tech sectors and agreed to buy 90% of Iran’s oil exports annually.
WASHINGTON CONTROLS CHINA’S OCEAN TRADE
Thanks to Iran’s influence over the Houthis, Chinese cargo ships and tankers have not been targeted by Yemeni militants. Still, for safety, Chinese shipping companies have rerouted vessels around Africa.
This highlights the irreplaceable role of the U.S. Navy in keeping global sea lanes open and safe—vital for world trade and especially for China.
China is more openly and swiftly preparing for a Taiwan invasion. The main obstacle? Donald Trump. Beijing began accelerating preparations after his return to the White House.
Despite large investments, China’s influence in the Middle East remains marginal. Its attempt to mediate the Israel-Palestine conflict failed, despite bringing all 14 Palestinian factions—including Hamas and Fatah—to agree on reconciliation.
Xi has been trying to pull Russia into the Indo-Pacific arena, aware that every ally counts against the U.S. The Indo-Pacific is the most critical region for China, both economically and geopolitically.
WILL THE U.S. KEEP GIVING CHINA OPPORTUNITIES?
The U.S.’s deepening involvement in global conflicts and counterproductive economic policies toward Europe create strategic openings for China—similar to those in the early 2000s.
China greatly benefited from the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the 2008 financial crisis, skillfully narrowing the economic, technological, and military gap with America.
Within China’s ruling elite and intellectual circles, there’s a growing belief that the U.S. is in decline, and now is the time for Beijing to present itself as a global alternative.
Xi, a devout follower of Confucian philosophy, is applying the wisdom of Confucius: “The essence of politics is to attract those far away and win the approval of those nearby.” Accordingly, China is trying to exploit Trump’s trade war with Europe to rebuild influence on the continent and improve ties with wary neighbors.
TAIWAN – THE ONLY POSSIBLE TRIGGER FOR WORLD WAR III
For over 50 years, U.S.–China relations were grounded in mutual ambiguity regarding Taiwan, allowing both sides to accept the status quo and avoid war.
But Taiwan is not just a geopolitical flashpoint—it’s also a tech battleground. While China controls two-thirds of the world’s rare earth metals, Taiwan produces two-thirds of the world’s semiconductors—critical for the digital era.
Xi has declared his intent to reunify Taiwan with China by 2049, the 100th anniversary of communist rule. But it’s widely believed he aims to achieve this sooner, ideally during his own rule.
China has been isolating and pressuring Taiwan—reducing its diplomatic allies to just a handful of Pacific microstates and the Vatican. Economic coercion is constant, and military drills are so frequent and large that it’s hard to tell where exercises end and real war begins. China also funds pro-reunification parties in Taiwan and pushes propaganda declaring that China and Taiwan are one.
The Ukraine and Israel-Iran conflicts are being closely watched in Beijing—to assess America’s willingness to commit resources for strategic goals, including defending Taiwan.
MILITARY POSTURING
For the first time this year, China sent two aircraft carriers past the second island chain deep into the Pacific—testing U.S. containment lines stretching from South Korea through Taiwan to Singapore.
China also tested floating docks and cranes needed for a beach invasion of Taiwan. A third aircraft carrier is expected to be operational by the end of the year.
Taiwan recently conducted the largest military exercise in its history, involving 20,000 reservists and simulating strategies to prevent Chinese landings—buying time until U.S. forces intervene.
Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are already on high alert and expected to assist Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.
A naval blockade or invasion remains unlikely in the short term—but cannot be ruled out mid-term. 2027 could be decisive—when Xi’s third term ends. Although constitutional changes allow indefinite reelection, Xi’s grip on power is no longer as absolute as before COVID.
Another risky moment: 2028, when Taiwan holds presidential and parliamentary elections. A loss for the China-friendly Kuomintang party could push Beijing toward military action.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END – OR THE END OF XI JINPING?
The noticeable decline in party media coverage of Xi, his repeated absences from public life, his no-show at the BRICS summit, and the unexplained disappearance or dismissal of close allies have fueled speculation about a possible leadership shake-up in China.
The appearance of Xi’s daughter Mingze at a dinner with Belarusian President Lukashenko has sparked completely opposing interpretations. Mingze studied at Harvard under a false name and has never appeared at any public event alongside her father since he became president. For some, this is a signal that Xi wants to project her as his successor; for others, it’s merely a courtesy gesture toward Lukashenko. The mystery was deepened by the removal of all news about Mingze’s presence from media controlled by the Party.
Another indication that something is brewing behind the scenes is Xi’s delegation of major and serious dossiers to his associates. Premier Li Qiang is handling domestic economic issues. Vice Premier He Lifeng is in charge of the customs war with the U.S. Cai Qi, a member of the Communist Party’s Politburo, is responsible for cyber challenges, while Wang Huning is the Party’s chief ideologist and its éminence grise.
This decentralization of power can be interpreted in two ways: as creating conditions for a race to succeed Xi as the head of the Party and state, or as an attempt by Xi to restore confidence within the Party, which has been significantly shaken due to a series of missteps and poor results in recent years—from managing the COVID-19 pandemic to the economic crisis.
Also not to be overlooked is the growing role of the military and certain generals. With a vertical increase in allocations for the army and armament, as well as plans for an invasion of Taiwan, the People’s Liberation Army has become a very important factor. It is not out of the question that Xi could use it to stay in power or solidify his position—or, conversely, that the military could use its position to impose a new leader.
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