A message to the world? If Trump can defeat Brussels, anyone can. The door is now open to future blackmail—not just from Washington, but from Beijing or any other center of power
Donald Trump relies on a violent negotiation strategy that is shockingly effective. Instead of diplomatic protocols, he uses threats, blackmail, and improvisation until he gets what he wants. His tactic is simple: create a scandal, then appear with an “offer” the other side, caught off guard and unprepared, has no choice but to accept.
For months, he has been threatening to impose tariffs—30%, 50%, even 100%—while other countries mostly sit paralyzed, trying to figure out whether he’s bluffing or serious. One by one, they realize that Trump isn’t bluffing, and last week, Europe capitulated—for all of us.
Trump had been announcing for four months that he would impose a 30% tariff on all European goods unless a different agreement was reached by August 1. Just four days earlier, on July 27, Trump and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen met at his golf resort in Scotland. In less than an hour, they reached a “great deal.” That deal introduced a record 15% tariff on most European exports to the U.S.—a huge jump from the previous average of 1.6%.
But that’s not all. Von der Leyen also agreed to additional commitments: the purchase of American energy products worth $750 billion and another $600 billion in investments in the U.S., including military equipment. That amount of money would otherwise have been invested within the EU, so even on paper this doesn’t look like a compromise—it looks like classic economic blackmail.
The hardest hit was the pharmaceutical industry, which accounts for €120 billion, or 23% of total EU exports to the U.S. It is estimated that pharmaceutical companies will bear an additional cost of €13 to €19 billion annually, while American consumers will also face slightly higher drug prices. Beyond that, companies like Novartis and AstraZeneca are already considering relocating their facilities from Europe to the U.S. to avoid the tariffs—a serious loss for the European economy and a major gain for the American one.
The wine and spirits industry is also among the most threatened because it relies not only on factories and export statistics but also on a wide ecosystem of small and medium-sized enterprises. This is a politically sensitive topic, especially for France and Italy. Around half a million jobs are at stake on both sides of the Atlantic—including vintners, producers, importers, distributors, retailers, and restaurateurs. Despite exporting $6 billion worth of wine and spirits to the U.S. last year, France and Italy failed to secure an exemption for this sector from the new tariffs.
Unlike Europe, Brazilian President Lula da Silva did not bow his head. He harshly condemned the measures as “economic imperialism” and stated that Brazil would not change its judiciary under external pressure.
Europe had several ways to push back but used none. For starters, it could have used the “Instrument for Protection Against Economic Coercion,” which it itself created and adopted in 2023 precisely for situations like this. With this tool, it could have excluded American companies from public procurement or revoked their intellectual property rights.
It could have responded with reciprocal tariffs, as it had done in previous trade disputes. It could have raised taxes on American tech giants. It also had the option of appealing to the World Trade Organization or launching a coordinated campaign with other countries facing similar U.S. pressure. The tools existed, but the will was absent.
Why? The answer lies in two deep weaknesses.
The first is internal disunity. Although the EU has a common market, it still lacks a unified external economic policy that would allow a swift and decisive response to outside threats. The interests of Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw often diverge, so even in cases of obvious provocation—like Trump’s aggressive tariff rates—the European Commission cannot act as a unified player.
This time, member state leaders did not give the Commission a mandate to activate the Instrument for Protection Against Economic Coercion, and thus Ursula entered the negotiations without support.
The second weakness is a strategic fear of offending the U.S. Many EU member states, particularly those in the Eastern bloc, rely on American protection within NATO. Because of the war in Ukraine and tensions with Russia, Europe has traded part of its economic power for American military protection—which Trump can also withdraw overnight. Put simply, the EU is militarily—and now economically—dependent on the U.S.
Although Brussels attempted to present the agreement as “balanced,” the reactions across Europe were anything but positive. The French prime minister is leading a wave of outrage, calling the agreement a “dark day for Europe” and an act of surrendering European values. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz officially accepted the agreement as a necessary evil that prevented escalation, but within Germany, it was seen as a fatal trade defeat. The loudest critic was Viktor Orbán, who stated that “Trump ate Ursula for breakfast.”
Message to the world?
If Trump can defeat Brussels, anyone can. The door is now open to future blackmail—not only from Washington but also from Beijing or any other center of power. Instead of demonstrating autonomy, the EU has confirmed its vulnerability and, as one analyst put it, has become “a prosperous but powerless pendant of the American empire.”
While Europe tries to explain this agreement as a forced balance, Brazil has become the next target. On July 31, Trump signed an executive order imposing a 50% tariff on most goods from Brazil, including steel, soy, and meat. With these tariffs, Trump is protecting not only American companies but also his friend—the former Brazilian president Bolsonaro—who is on trial for attempting a coup in 2022. In Trump’s eyes, that’s not a crime, but loyalty, making economic pressure a tool of political revenge.
Europe had multiple ways to resist—but didn’t use a single one. For example, it could have activated the very Instrument for Protection Against Economic Coercion it introduced in 2023.
Unlike Europe, President Lula da Silva did not back down. He strongly condemned the measures as “economic imperialism” and said Brazil would not reform its judiciary under foreign pressure. In addition, Brazil’s Congress passed a law enabling reciprocal 50% tariffs if the U.S. actually enforces its measure.
Lula’s resistance seems like an anomaly in a world increasingly accepting American pressure without protest. Lula doesn’t ignore the reality of asymmetric power, but he refuses to accept a trade policy based on blackmail. The European Union reacted reflexively and defensively, while Lula uses the moment to articulate a sovereignty-based policy in which the national interest cannot be traded—no matter the cost.
Even Serbia wasn’t left untouched. On July 8, Trump imposed a 35% tariff on Serbian exports and 30% on exports from Bosnia and Herzegovina, citing “unfair trade practices” and “overly close cooperation with China” as formal reasons.
Yet, the news barely made a ripple in Belgrade. Why? Because the U.S. accounts for only about 2% of Serbia’s total exports—meaning the effect will be more symbolic than real. The primary targets were tires, weapons, and machine parts. Accordingly, the Serbian government had more pressing matters than negotiations. There were no emergency sessions or dramatic press conferences. 35% tariffs? Welcome to the news ticker at the bottom of the screen.
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