Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump have done more to forge a common European defense policy than anyone in recent history. Through their actions, the Russian president and the former U.S. president have effectively forced Berlin, Paris, and London to do what they failed to accomplish after World War II.
More than seventy years ago, alongside the European Coal and Steel Community—the seed of today’s European Union—plans were also made for a European Defense Community. This project, envisioned by the EU’s founding fathers, was meant to be the political arm of European integration, complementing economic cooperation and ultimately leading to the federalization of the continent.
However, following the trauma of World War II, France strongly opposed the idea of a joint armed force. At the time, it was developing its independent nuclear deterrent, the “Force de frappe,” and wanted to ensure its sovereignty through atomic capability rather than by creating a shared European army.
Cornerstones of European Defense
The signing of the Kensington Agreement (UK and Germany), the Northwood Declaration (UK and France), and the recently signed Nancy Friendship Treaty (France and Poland) are the three foundational pillars of a future European defense system.
The European defense project remained dormant for seven decades—until Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine and Trump returned to the White House, accelerating the U.S.–EU split and casting doubt on the credibility of NATO’s Article 5.
The emergence of an aggressive, imperialist adversary on Europe’s eastern borders, combined with the threat of losing America’s protective umbrella, served as a wake-up call for Europeans. Complacent in the post–Berlin Wall “end of history” era, they believed that economics and trade would rationalize and drive the world. The scale of Europe’s disarmament and military degradation over the past 25 years—barring a few exceptions—was deeply alarming.
The German Army’s land forces commander, General Alfons Mais, was brutally honest on the first day of Russia’s Ukraine invasion:
“While the Russians attack Ukraine, the army I have the honor to lead is left in its underwear.”
From “Campers” to Real Armed Forces
Berlin, London, and Paris eventually came to a stark realization: had they not allowed their armed forces to become more like “campers” than real militaries, Putin might have thought twice before attacking Ukraine.
Determined to rearm together and act in synergy, the UK, Germany, and France now share clear goals: to reduce dependence on the U.S. as much as possible and to build military forces strong enough to deter any future Russian moves against NATO or EU members on Europe’s eastern flank.
The UK wants to upgrade its readiness for warfare and rapid deployment—key doctrines of its security policy. Germany has embarked on a rearmament drive unprecedented since WWII. France has finally found a new military identity following the loss of its colonial empire.
History has now united—without external tutelage or internal dominance—the British, Germans, and French, alongside the Poles, on a shared mission to protect Europe from Russian ambitions. Nations that fought each other for centuries are now proof that a common enemy can unite more effectively than shared values or interests.
This defense cooperation is also speeding up post-Brexit rapprochement between the UK and the EU. A UK return to the EU is far off, but bilateral agreements with Berlin and Paris mark significant first steps.
Three Pillars of European Defense
The Kensington Agreement, Northwood Declaration, and Nancy Treaty are the bedrock of Europe’s new defense architecture. Despite assurances from leaders like Emmanuel Macron, Keir Starmer, Friedrich Merz, and Donald Tusk that these treaties are not substitutes for NATO, it’s clear that as the U.S. retreats from Europe, NATO in its current form becomes increasingly obsolete.
Strikingly, each of the three agreements includes mutual defense pledges—regardless of NATO obligations. This raises a valid question: if Article 5 already requires such assistance, why emphasize mutual defense in these treaties unless they are the beginnings of a NATO alternative?
Europe won’t formally end NATO, but it must be ready if the U.S. does. It must ensure not only the continent’s security but also possess the means and structures to enforce it.
“We will defend Europe’s security, peace, and values,” declared the leaders of France, Germany, and the UK after the agreements in London and Northwood.
France and the UK bring nuclear arsenals and UN Security Council seats; Germany contributes its industrial might, especially in arms manufacturing.
Why Repeat the Article 5 Commitment?
The mutual defense clause in all three agreements is telling. If NATO already mandates such aid, why restate it—unless it signals the rise of a NATO substitute?
An expansion of British and French nuclear deterrence to cover all EU and NATO members in Europe marks another tectonic shift in the continent’s security architecture. The Northwood Declaration states that while the two nuclear arsenals will remain independent, they will be coordinated and capable of joint action:
“Any extreme threat to Europe will lead to a joint response by both nations.”
Unlike Germany and the UK, France and Britain have a long history of defense agreements, from the 1995 Chequers Declaration to the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties.
This “trilateral club” may expand, though the Paris–London–Berlin triangle is expected to remain the core. Poland already signed a mutual defense pact with France in May. Had Mario Draghi still led Italy, we might now be talking about a “quadrilateral” of European defense. But that’s the difference between Draghi and Giorgia Meloni—it’s an internal Italian issue.
Thanks to Draghi, Italy did sign the Quirinale Treaty with France and an Action Plan with Germany, and is negotiating a defense agreement with the UK. These are solid building blocks for turning the triangle into a square. But under Meloni’s leadership, that will be difficult. It wouldn’t be surprising if Poland replaces Italy in this core group—especially if Donald Tusk wins reelection.
Creating a full EU army remains unrealistic in the near future. But the EU, alongside France, Germany, and the UK, can do what it does best: foster an environment for an efficient and productive joint market for arms and defense materials.
The British-German Alliance
Historically, Britain and Germany have cooperated dynastically, militarily, and politically—from the Seven Years’ War to the campaigns against Napoleon. But the 20th century saw them on opposing sides in two world wars.
Germany gave Britain a royal family and royal spouses, but in their shared history, they signed only one military agreement prior to the Kensington pact: the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement, where Nazi Germany pledged its naval strength would not exceed 35% of Britain’s—a revision of the Versailles Treaty, which had barred Germany from naval expansion after WWI.
Signing the Kensington Agreement at a palace dedicated to Queen Victoria and her German consort, Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, carried rich symbolism. That this is the first defense treaty of its kind between London and Berlin gives it both historical weight and political significance—especially following the nuclear-centered agreement with France just days earlier.
The Franco-German Shield
Before becoming chancellor, Friedrich Merz broke a longstanding German taboo: he opened the door for France’s nuclear umbrella to cover the entire EU, including Germany. Macron had offered this three years earlier to Olaf Scholz, who, like his predecessors, declined—preferring to rely exclusively on American protection.
France has long sought to bring Germany into a firmer European position independent of the U.S.—since the days of Charles de Gaulle. But Bonn, and later Berlin, always gave the same answer: Washington was the only address for security and nuclear protection.
De Gaulle tried to include provisions in the 1963 Treaty of Friendship — the cornerstone of relations between Paris and Berlin — that would pull the Federal Republic out of the American military embrace. However, just before the agreement was signed, the leadership of the CDU demanded that Adenauer insert a sentence into the text stating that the agreement would not weaken ties with the United States. In other words, there were no bigger “Americans” in the EU than the Germans, even though they occasionally acted independently or pursued their own interests contrary to those of the United States — such as the reunification of Germany, recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, or their refusal to participate in the Iraq war in 2003.
Barely three months have passed since Merz promised in his inaugural address to the Bundestag that “Germany intends to build the strongest military in Europe,” and the first clear steps in that direction are already visible.
After reaching an agreement with the United Kingdom and establishing excellent cooperation with Macron, the next step is to sign a “Treaty of Friendship” with Poland, whose content is expected to follow the letter and spirit of the agreement signed by Macron and Tusk in early May in Nancy. In this way, the circle of bilateral agreements between the most important EU and NATO member states on the European continent would be completed — forming a credible alternative in case of a potential U.S. withdrawal from Europe.
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