A ground assault on the capital as a blueprint for a “Greater Israel” — between the American shield and growing global resistance
The Israeli ground assault on Gaza City only gained its full dimension once columns of tanks, armored personnel carriers and engineering units descended into the heart of the urban maze — neighborhood by neighborhood, block by block — supported by airstrikes that erase entire streets. The official formula remains the same: destroy Hamas as a military and governance structure and return Israeli captives. But the way the operation is being carried out — deep occupation, establishment of permanent “security zones,” fracturing territory into isolated pockets — indicates a broader aim: to change the status quo in the Gaza Strip forever. Gaza City was the first major target because it is the political, urban and symbolic center — taking the city is not the end, but a springboard for structural change across the strip.
Militarily, Israel combines classic urban-warfare doctrine with an industrial pace of destruction: systematic “softening up” by artillery and air power, followed by methodical clearing. The tunnel network and the blending of fighters with civilians make operations slow and bloody. But the breadth of declared goals — disarm, “expel” Hamas leadership, “ensure” that the previous situation never returns — confirms the suspicion (for anyone who still had doubts) that this is not just about neutralizing one organization but about demographic-territorial engineering. Increasingly loud voices in Israel’s political arena talk of “Gaza being totally destroyed,” with ideas of “sterile zones” and permanent Israeli military presence. Meanwhile, settlements on the West Bank are spreading quickly. Together, this forms a pattern: mapping a territory without Palestinian sovereignty — a “solution” based on permanent subordination.
The numbers confirm the scale of the tragedy. Local health sources report tens of thousands killed — by mid-September 2025 almost 65,000 dead (and that is probably a conservative estimate because thousands are listed as “missing” under the rubble). In many neighborhoods of Gaza City streets are unrecognizable; infrastructure is pulverized, water and power supplies have collapsed, hospitals are overwhelmed or out of service. Famine and disease are spreading as a second wave of the war. Under these conditions, the contradiction between the two nominal objectives — a massive, “maximalist” crackdown on Hamas and an alleged simultaneous care for the lives of Israeli hostages — becomes stark. The tactics that demolish city blocks are hard to reconcile with precise rescues (!), and domestic pressure from the captives’ families demanding exchanges and pauses collides with the hardliners’ ultimatum.
Will the world react more forcefully? The legal architecture is already in place: the International Court of Justice found a “plausible risk” of genocide and ordered urgent measures to protect civilians. UN investigative bodies went further, stating that the Israeli campaign bears features of genocide. But legal labels by themselves do not stop tanks. Western governments have long sheltered Israel politically and logistically, hiding behind the refrain of a “right to self-defense.” Only as massive civilian casualties and images of destroyed hospitals accumulate — along with growing demonstrations against Israeli aggression — have some European countries begun to curb arms export licenses, impose targeted bans on radical ministers, and suspend talks. Elsewhere more is happening: blocs of states coordinate to block ships bearing arms, advance criminal proceedings and push for a general embargo. In short: Israel’s international isolation is increasing, but the balance of power and interests is not yet at the point where the war would be halted.
The key, as always, is Washington. Under the Trump administration American support for Israel has not only been restored but ideologically sharpened. The Security Council veto remains reflexive — military aid and political patronage are constants. Occasional “rebukes” after spectacular crimes — for example after an attack on a Christian church — do not change the fundamental course: the United States signals it will not accept international courts and accountability mechanisms when they target the Israeli leadership. In practice this means the principal protective umbrella remains intact. As long as that is the case, it is hard to expect binding international coercion that would stop the war.
Muslim-majority countries are responding more sharply in rhetoric and somewhat more concretely economically, but this is still not enough to change much. Turkey has cut trade, closed airspace and ports to Israeli ships and lowered relations to a historic minimum. Ankara openly speaks of genocide and says Israeli expansion destabilizes the wider region, though direct military confrontation remains unlikely because of realpolitik and NATO commitments. Egypt is playing a dual role: it firmly rejects the scenario of ethnic cleansing via Rafah — a mass flow into Sinai is a red line — but at the same time mediates truces (or at least talks) and exchanges, aware that Gaza’s collapse could detonate Egyptian security. The Gulf monarchies publicly condemn and send humanitarian aid, but stop short of severing ties — there has not been a break in the “Abraham Accords” established during Trump’s first term.
Jordan and Bahrain have recalled ambassadors, the UAE remains on the sidelines, and Saudi Arabia is cooling contacts. The common denominator: no one wants to formally sign away the Palestinian people, but no one is risking open war with Israel either.
In this environment Benjamin Netanyahu increasingly speaks of relying on Israel’s own defense industry and diversifying weapons sources. In practice that means accelerated lines for ammunition, guided bombs, drones, and missile-defense systems — and the intention to keep the war machine running even without Western “fuel.” Such a strategy acknowledges what the government rarely admits (though Netanyahu has begun to): international support is eroding, and Israel is willing to live with isolation if that isolation buys room to pursue goals on the ground. When the prime minister simultaneously flirts with the idea of a “Greater Israel,” the whole program acquires an ideological frame: Gaza and the West Bank are not temporary “security problems” but a testing ground for “historically correcting” borders — even if it risks pushing the state toward the status of a “pariah” (Netanyahu apparently deeply believes this will not happen, and he may well be right).
What does Israeli society say? The trauma of October 7 left deep fear and a desire for “total victory,” and wartime unity still exists — but it is increasingly fragile. Families of the captives are breaking through media barriers and demanding deals instead of endless destruction. Reservists and the economy are suffering: hi-tech is seeing capital and talent outflows, security risks are shifting costs onto the whole economy, and the currency is unstable. Internal cracks — from exemptions for ultra-Orthodox groups to corruption scandals — bring protests back to the streets whenever bombing quiets. At the same time, the hardline core of the coalition conditions its survival on continuing the war until “complete achievement of goals.” In such a vise politics feeds off war, and war feeds off politics.
What follows on the ground? Taking Gaza City may bring symbolism, but not an end. A more realistic scenario is fragmentation: permanent “security zones,” surveillance of key routes, increasing dependence of remaining Palestinian enclaves on Israeli will and cross-border charity. Hamas can be degraded but the idea of resistance won’t disappear — it will go deeper underground into guerrilla form. The worst outcome is regional spillover from the Lebanese front and beyond; the best is a fragile ceasefire that cements a new tragic reality without a political solution. For Palestinians this means a prolonged humanitarian catastrophe and the risk of demographic pushing toward the south; for the region it means frozen normalization, insecure energy and trade routes, and greater dependence on the will of great powers.
Will the world “finally” act? Not with one spectacular decision, but through the accumulation of small obstacles: judicial cases, embargoes on certain arms components, insurers refusing coverage, ports closing, ever greater market and reputational costs. If that pressure ecosystem is integrated into the policies of major powers, the war can become politically unsustainable even under the American umbrella. If not, Gaza will remain a laboratory of lawlessness where the strong write the rules and the weak disappear from the map — first metaphorically, then physically.
That is why the ground assault on Gaza cannot be seen only as a battle but as a project to redraw the political geography of the eastern Mediterranean. The outcome depends on the equation of force and will: Israeli decisions to push toward a “Greater Israel,” American choices to protect that push, and the rest of the world’s willingness to turn moral condemnation into operational levers of power. Without that third angle, the “solution” will be written in ruins.
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