Bombings in the South and Over Damascus Are Part of a Plan to Fragment Syria, Secure a Loyal Enclave, and Push Toward Water Supplies in the Golan, Where Every Drop Is Becoming Strategically Crucial
On July 16, 2025, Israeli fighter jets breached Syrian airspace and bombed targets in Damascus as well as deep in the south, along roads leading to the Al-Suwayda region, predominantly inhabited by Druze. In the same wave of attacks, armored vehicle depots, a building belonging to the General Staff, and air defense positions were targeted. The Syrian government confirmed dozens of military and civilian casualties. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu justified the operation as an “absolute necessity” to protect the “Druze brothers” from an alleged pogrom carried out by the new Islamist government in Damascus.
That the new Islamist regime—a former offshoot of al-Qaeda—is committing atrocities against anyone who doesn’t align with its radical ideology (Shiites, Alawites, Christians, etc.) is not surprising. Nor is it surprising that Israel, for years (along with the West, Arab monarchies, and various radical groups), supported the downfall of Syria’s secular government.
Of course, in the Middle East, few things remain purely in the realm of humanitarian rhetoric.
This escalation is the culmination of a chain of events in Al-Suwayda, where in recent weeks local Druze committees clashed with Sunni Bedouin militias over kidnappings, water supplies, and even improvised toll checkpoints. When the (new) Syrian army arrived to “calm the situation,” rumors began circulating that the regular troops were siding with the Bedouins. Panic spread across the Golan—around a thousand Israeli Druze breached the border fence and attempted to help relatives on the other side, while Syrian Druze families tried to flee into Israel. All of this gave Tel Aviv the perfect excuse to present itself as a “peacemaker” while actively cutting Syrian supply lines.
To understand the emotional stakes, one must understand who the Druze are. They are an Arab ethno-religious community that emerged in the 19th century through a unique synthesis of Ismaili theology, Neoplatonism, and regional customs. They are closed to conversion, marriages are largely endogamous, and religious texts are guarded by elders. Today, there are about 1.5 million Druze scattered across Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and the diaspora. In Israel, they enjoy a unique status: unlike most Arabs, Druze serve in the IDF and are often seen as loyal citizens. This historical closeness is now being used as a moral cover for airstrikes well beyond the Golan.
Israel claims it is preventing ethnic cleansing, but the geopolitical motives are thinly veiled beneath the rhetoric. Since 1967, the doctrine has been clear—your neighbor must be weak, divided, and consumed by internal conflict. During the Syrian war, Israel occasionally opened field hospitals for wounded militants and, according to credible reports, even supplied logistics to certain Islamist factions—anything to bleed Assad, a secular leader allied with Iran. Now, with Assad deposed and replaced by a coalition of Sunni fundamentalists, Tel Aviv has flipped the script and “discovered” that Damascus threatens minorities. The logic is consistent only in that Syria must never reemerge as a sovereign, unified state—no matter who is in charge!
Syria’s Islamist authorities have responded angrily: “A covert act of aggression, in coordination with regional hegemons.” In Damascus, ordinary citizens haven’t forgotten that Western powers, including Israel, spent years undermining the previous regime. They now clearly see that the same hand that toppled Bashar al-Assad is also destroying his successors. Even those Syrians who, more than a decade ago, welcomed every form of foreign intervention (financial, political, military…) with hope for peace, now believe that the only consistent outcome of such interventions has been the dismantling of Syrian institutions—regardless of who occupies the presidential palace.
Simultaneously, a new flashpoint is igniting in Lebanon—Israeli bombs struck Hezbollah storage facilities in the Bekaa Valley, causing civilian casualties. With this move, Israel is openly applying pressure on both fronts. It’s unlikely, in fact nearly impossible, that Hezbollah would support the new regime in Damascus (they literally fought them for years). Furthermore, relations between the Druze and Hezbollah are complicated—Lebanese Druze magnate Walid Jumblatt has for decades accused the Shiite militia of militarizing the state, while his rival, Talal Arslan, has sometimes tactically cooperated with Hezbollah. Still, both factions now share an interest in keeping Israel out of Syrian territory, if only to preserve their political balance within Lebanon.
The question most concerning to Syria—and to outside observers—is whether Israel is using the Druze to create a loyal enclave in southern Syria. There is historical precedent: southern Lebanon was controlled until 2000 through the proxy South Lebanon Army, and the Golan was unilaterally annexed in 1981. The idea of a “buffer microstate” fits neatly into Israel’s strategy of layered defense (or perhaps the creation of a Greater Israel?)—with the Druze as local border guards and a cushion between the IDF and potential Iranian allies. Moreover, the southern Syrian plateau is rich in water, and under current climate stress, every drop becomes strategic, further fueling interest in controlling the Yarmouk River’s headwaters.
Israel’s need to control Syrian water sources is not a new geopolitical ambition—it has deep roots in the region’s complex geopolitics and natural geography. Among the most important Syrian water resources attracting Israeli attention are the Yarmouk River sources and several underground aquifers near the Golan Heights. The Yarmouk, the largest tributary of the Jordan River, is vital not only to Syria but also to Jordan and Israel. For Israel—a country known for chronic water shortages—control of this area provides a powerful geostrategic advantage, granting access to additional water reserves that are becoming increasingly precious.
Israel has faced serious water supply challenges for decades. A growing population, intensive agriculture, and a warming climate have drastically depleted its already limited natural sources. Although Israel has become a global leader in desalination and wastewater recycling, these methods are still insufficient to meet the country’s future needs—especially given projected worsening climate conditions. Forecasts suggest rainfall will continue to decline, while water demand will nearly double by 2050.
Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights in 1967 was partly motivated by control of water sources and underground aquifers. The current escalation into Syrian territory only deepens that logic. In the long term, control over Syrian water sources could provide Israel not only with additional drinking water reserves but also critical leverage in future political negotiations or regional resource trading. For Tel Aviv, water is not merely an environmental or economic issue—it is a vital national security matter shaping geopolitical decisions since the state’s founding. That is why Israel’s presence in the Syrian border zone carries a deeper strategic dimension: long-term water security in a region where future conflicts may very well be fought over control of drinking water.
The Druze in Syria have traditionally been fiercely autonomous and resist the label of “Israeli clients.” Their spiritual leader, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, appealed for “international, not Israeli” protection, and Jumblatt explicitly warned that accepting Israeli patronage would be political suicide for the Druze community’s standing in the Arab world. Even within Israel, some Druze reservists have publicly questioned the idea of a permanent occupation of Syrian territory, aware that this would turn their own relatives into targets in a never-ending war of foreign interests.
In a broader context, the reactions of major powers reveal cracks in the global order. Washington “understands Israeli concerns” but calls for restraint—which, in practice, amounts to a green light. Moscow and Beijing have condemned the attack as a violation of the UN Charter and are calling for an emergency Security Council session, though they hold no illusions that Western permanent members will allow a binding resolution. Iran, weakened by internal unrest, issues rhetorical threats but will likely entrust the response to Hezbollah—which means the conflict could easily spill further over the already burning Lebanon–Syria border.
In conclusion, the protection of the Druze is just the tip of the iceberg. The real goal is the deepening of Syria’s fragmentation and the prevention of any central authority that might, someday, challenge Israel or create a land bridge from Tehran to Beirut. The Syrian tragedy reminds us, yet again, that minority emancipation is not achieved with F-35s but through political inclusion within sovereign, stable states. As the world watches, Tel Aviv is testing how far it can push the line without a sharp reaction—from anyone. If it succeeds, the precedent will echo far and wide. That’s why today’s Damascus is, sadly, much more than just another point on the map of a war-torn Levant. It is a new Israeli test—and a preview of plans to expel Palestinians from Gaza and/or build something that increasingly resembles a concentration camp on the ruins of Rafah.
Since Netanyahu knows he can absolutely count on the support of Trump (despite Trump having attempted to establish ties with the new Islamist regime in Damascus), he likely won’t stop anytime soon.
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