Trump’s Ultimatum Is a High-Risk Gambit, Not a Thought-Out Strategy
Donald Trump’s ultimatum—giving Moscow about ten days to end the war or face 100% tariffs and secondary sanctions on anyone trading with Russia—was meant to serve as a form of shock therapy. But the Kremlin responds with indifference: the “immunity” to sanctions has been building for years, and Russia’s economic engine, though under pressure, continues to function almost unimpeded. Instead of collapsing, Russia has exploited global cracks—exposing how far the world economic order is from the unity Washington still imagines.
The key leverage remains energy, but the story doesn’t end with oil and gas. When Europe shut its doors, Russian raw materials almost instantly found an Asian destination. Last year, China absorbed over a third of all Russian exports, and Beijing’s massive appetite for discounted oil, LNG, and coal pushed mutual trade to a record $240 billion. Chinese refineries, banks, and shipping companies use yuan, rubles, or dirhams for transactions—bypassing the dollar system and further undermining American financial hegemony.
On the other hand, India overnight became the largest buyer of Russian crude oil. An incredible leap—from 2% to nearly 36% of India’s total imports—shows the gravitational pull of a $20-per-barrel discount. New Delhi profits doubly: it refines Russian oil and then supplies derivatives to the West, which insists it does not buy Russian oil (!). As a result, the U.S. strategy turns into a caricature of itself, while cheap energy fills the Indian budget.
Equally important is the role of Turkey, the UAE, and the Caucasus–Central Asian “cushion” through which Western machinery and electronics flow in parallel imports. Despite being a NATO member, Ankara has become a logistical hub: Russian “dark fleet” tankers pass through the Bosporus, while Turkish exports of consumer goods and spare parts to Russia are increasing. A similar pattern is visible in Dubai, Astana, and Yerevan.
Although energy remains the backbone, Moscow also relies on other raw materials. Wheat, fertilizers, palladium, nickel, and aluminum have generated billions in foreign currency income—largely untouched by sanctions due to the West’s fear of global food and tech crises. The record 2022 harvest was immortalized by images of Russian grain being shipped under neutral flags to Egypt or Nigeria, while the European port of Dunkirk is supplied with palladium essential to Germany’s automotive industry. The sanctions regime thus supports an absurd situation where “banned” exports must continue—because the West would suffer as well.
Alongside this external trade redirection, internal stabilization measures played a crucial role. In the first week of the war, the Bank of Russia froze capital flows, raised interest rates to 20%, and required exporters to convert foreign currency earnings. The result was a short-term shock followed by a spectacular ruble recovery. Whenever foreign currency earnings dropped, controlled ruble depreciation was allowed—automatically boosting export revenue in local currency, and thus filling the state budget.
Russia’s public debt remains below 20% of GDP, and the National Welfare Fund still holds gold and yuan beyond the reach of Western treasuries. This fiscal cushion allows for subsidies to domestic industry and military production without monetary chaos. The introduction of the domestic payment system “Mir” replaced Visa and Mastercard, while SWIFT is countered by Russia’s SPFS and China’s CIPS. Citizens can pay, government bonds are auctioned, and ATMs operate—all within a parallel financial architecture untouched by Trump’s decrees.
Still, resilience is not the same as diversification. While agriculture has genuinely flourished and the military-industrial complex continues to deliver drones and missile engines from Latin America to Africa, high technology remains Russia’s Achilles’ heel. The Western pullout shut down chip and software supply chains. The gap is filled by Chinese brands, which now hold 90% of Russia’s car and consumer electronics markets. Instead of technological emancipation, Moscow risks replacing dependency on the West with dependency on Beijing—though the latter prefers political bargaining over moral lecturing.
Trump’s proposed stick of secondary sanctions could theoretically cut many of these channels. But in practice, implementation would require Washington to punish both Beijing and New Delhi—thereby disrupting its own supply chains, driving up fuel prices for American voters, and possibly triggering a new recession. China would likely respond by further internationalizing the yuan and accelerating work on alternative payment systems. India would negotiate, but would surely demand massive concessions to abandon its discounted oil imports. In fact, Trump announced today that he would impose 25% tariffs on India starting August 1.
Because of this, U.S. strategy risks deepening geopolitical rifts. Forcing the “neutral” to choose sides could push the entire “non-aligned” world closer to Beijing and Moscow. BRICS is already discussing joint financial institutions (e.g., a common clearinghouse), and Saudi interest in selling oil for yuan, not dollars, signals that the magical power of the petrodollar is no longer untouchable. In other words, the attempt to financially strangle Russia may end up accelerating the creation of a world split into two separate economic spheres—one under U.S. and the other under Sino-Russian jurisdiction—ultimately weakening Washington’s global reach.
Domestically, the Russian government is counting on a combination of flexible exchange rates, disciplined fiscal policy, and undying global demand for raw materials to fund the war effort and maintain social stability for years to come. Inflation is indeed higher than before the war, and technological stagnation is becoming increasingly visible, but existential collapse remains far off. As long as tankers cut across the seas, and grain and fertilizers find their way to markets, the Kremlin will have the foreign currency it needs to pay wages and pensions.
From Washington’s perspective, this means the new round of sanctions is unlikely to produce the desired political breakthrough, but may further accelerate processes already undermining U.S. dominance: de-dollarization, yuan expansion, the strengthening of southern trade corridors, and the consolidation of a political coalition outside the Western bloc. This announced offensive thus resembles a high-stakes gambit more than a carefully crafted strategy.
Russia, aware of its own weaknesses and far from invincible, has so far managed to turn every new sanction into a motive for finding new detours. Trump’s plan may hurt Moscow’s budget in the short term—but in the long run, it might damage the very idea of American economic supremacy.
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