A possible Putin–Trump deal goes much deeper than just Ukraine – it concerns a global redistribution of power, and ending up on the wrong side now will mean permanent degradation
Big things are happening, at least potentially. Trump and Putin are announcing a summit which, according to official statements, could end the war in Ukraine. While nervousness grows in Brussels, cautious optimism prevails in Moscow and Washington – the optimism of two players who are finally negotiating directly, aware that centuries-old geopolitical logic makes them natural rivals, but also allies when it comes to breaking European unity. If a deal is truly reached, it’s clear that the biggest loser will be the European Union, whose foreign policy amounts to reacting to the moves of others.
Trump needs a quick, dramatic success – both the domestic and global public are tired of a war that was presented from the start as a “battle of democracy against authoritarianism” but has now turned into an expensive stalemate. Putin, on the other hand, has the luxury of time: the Russian economy, though under sanctions, has found outlets in the East and South, and the Kremlin can, in theory, wage war for years. However, Russia’s leadership knows that prolonged military exhaustion would undermine the state’s financial foundations. The summit proposal therefore comes at the right moment for both presidents.
The scenario under consideration in Washington is almost a textbook “realpolitik” deal: freezing the front line with formal or informal recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea and part of Donbas, in exchange for the lifting of some sanctions and the return of Russian energy to Western markets. Trump would, of course, sell this package to voters as “peace without an American soldier on the front” and “falling gas prices.” For Putin, it would be a wartime victory – perhaps smaller than expected, perhaps far more costly than expected, but still a victory.
Europe finds itself in a paradox – it is the loudest advocate of Ukrainian sovereignty while being the most economically vulnerable if the war drags on. Inflation, energy turbulence, and a rising right wing in the EU are fueling the growth of a “peace lobby” that could, especially in countries like Germany and France, quietly accept a deal coming from the White House. But EU institutions remain rhetorically firm because they cannot afford to publicly admit they have no means of pressuring Moscow beyond sanctions, which have been producing diminishing returns for years. Even less can they admit that such an outcome of the war, aside from Kyiv’s fate, would be the EU’s greatest defeat.
For Kyiv, the proposed “air moratorium” might be only a temporary relief. Suspending missile strikes would certainly save civilian lives but would deprive Ukraine of one of its few asymmetric tools – long-range drones hitting Russian logistics lines.
In the Kremlin, the offer is seen in broader terms: if Trump lifts secondary sanctions, Russia could return at least part of its gas volumes to European markets – perhaps indirectly through third countries. This would reactivate revenues needed for the military budget and strengthen Moscow’s bargaining position with Beijing, which is increasingly using Russia’s weaknesses to secure favorable energy contracts. In other words, Putin would be buying strategic autonomy between China and the US, while Trump would gain leverage over Beijing in trade talks.
Within NATO, a crack would open: Eastern European members, who see the war as existential, are already warning that peace must not be built on “selling” Ukrainian territory. But since their security guarantees depend on the US, resistance will likely be reduced to loud declarations without real consequences. Western Europe, exhausted by inflation and the rise of populism, would quietly breathe a sigh of relief if the war ended – even on Russian terms.
The Trump administration is less concerned with moral messages and more with the global redistribution of resources. Europe, having already abandoned cheap Russian energy, will have to continue expensively diversifying imports, while the US positions itself as the main supplier of LNG and arms. If it also secures Russian restraint toward China, Washington achieves a double win – reducing the cost of its engagement in Europe and focusing on Indo-Pacific competition.
If the summit ends only with a limited agreement, the war will shift into a “frozen” state that will lose media appeal. Trump will claim he “stopped the bloodshed,” and Putin will claim he “protected the Russian people.” Europe will be torn between the need to rebuild war-torn Ukraine and its internal political crises. Ukrainian leaders will lose both of their main levers – Western focus and a strong moral narrative – while the conflict will still smolder on the ground, ready to flare up whenever it becomes opportune for one side.
The world may be entering a new phase of multipolarity: by redefining relations, the US and Russia open the possibility of redistributing global power, with Europe, lacking its own strategic compass, risking the status of a peripheral observer. The irony is that the very continent that most forcefully pushed sanctions and “values-based diplomacy” will be left without a seat at the table when the curtain falls.
In any case, the Trump–Putin summit will not be just a symbolic meeting – it will be a litmus test of Europe’s ability to act as a sovereign player. If it remains at the level of protest notes and declarative solidarity with Kyiv, Brussels will confirm what the Kremlin and the White House already suspect: the old continent has spent its geopolitical capital and now stands on the sidelines while others draw new maps of power. And peace – however much it is desired – always comes at a high price for those who did not shape it.
Of course, assuming in advance that we are suddenly at the very end of the war could be a bad prediction, especially when we know that one of the key players is Donald Trump! It would be hard even to count how many times in just over half a year in office he has “flipped” on the Ukraine issue. It is enough to follow the media reactions, which are already entering short-circuit mode. First they feared Trump, then they excitedly celebrated his “turn” (or several) when he announced he would continue to aid Ukraine after all. Now, as he suddenly announces a meeting with Putin, panic is rising again, and we can already read today about how Trump will “fall into Putin’s trap.” In other words – no one who has taken Kyiv’s side in this war is happy that the meeting is happening at all.
In doing so, they once again reveal their militaristic face. The very idea that the war could soon be over causes great unease in some – and when we consider that these are the people leading Europe, the situation can only be described as frightening.
As for Trump, it can be said that he has managed to disappoint all sides. Can he now at least partly redeem himself? That would certainly be a positive outcome – to finally end at least one war and fulfill some of his campaign promises. Of course, stopping the war in Ukraine would give the world a much greater chance for peace. At the same time, Trump is well aware that a united Russia and China – and now perhaps India – is something America will not be able to cope with for long. The goal, therefore, remains the same – to reconcile with Russia and do everything possible to prevent the Russian-Chinese alliance from developing into something far more compact and powerful.
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