In a global context, it is becoming increasingly clear that the future distribution of power will not depend solely on military or financial strength, but also on access to and control over strategic resources
In today’s world, where power boundaries are shifting from armed conflicts to energy sources, raw materials, and technological dominance, the African continent is emerging as a key geopolitical factor. Africa—often overlooked in global strategy discussions—is now in the spotlight because of its vast wealth of natural resources, particularly minerals critical to the energy transition, digital economy, and the new industrial revolution.
As the world rapidly turns to renewable energy, electric vehicles, smart technologies, and decarbonization, Africa’s minerals are gaining strategic importance that will shape power relations in the 21st century.
Africa is home to around 30% of the world’s reserves of critical minerals—including lithium, cobalt, copper, graphite, rare earth elements, platinum, chromium, and manganese. Many of these raw materials are essential for producing batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, electronic components, and high-tech equipment.
For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) supplies nearly 70% of the world’s cobalt production—a key component in lithium-ion batteries that power electric vehicles and store energy. The DRC, Zambia, and Namibia hold significant copper reserves, vital for electric grids and electronics, while South Africa is a global leader in platinum group metals production.
These resources form the foundation of a new economic order. As the world faces climate change challenges and pushes for decarbonization, the demand for so-called “critical minerals” is growing exponentially. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), by 2040, global demand for lithium could increase by up to 40 times compared to 2020 levels, while demand for cobalt and nickel could triple. Electrification of transportation, development of smart grids, digital transformation, and military equipment production all depend on these raw materials.
Consequently, Africa’s minerals are becoming the focus of intense geopolitical competition. On one side, China has built a powerful strategy that enables it to dominate the rare mineral value chain—from extraction to processing and final production. Specifically, China was early to recognize that controlling the sources of rare minerals is a crucial advantage.
Though it has significant domestic reserves, China’s strategy also includes actively investing in mining capacities in other countries—such as those in Africa, Australia, and South America. This ensures diversified sources of raw materials and reduces reliance on imports.
Through state-owned companies and partnerships with local governments, China has secured exclusive rights and long-term contracts for mineral exploitation. Additionally, China has invested heavily in developing its processing and refining capacities for rare minerals, which are often technically demanding and capital-intensive.
The question is no longer if Africa’s minerals will shape the future of global power—because the answer is clearly yes—but who will benefit from it.
Just as importantly, China has introduced export restrictions—not only on raw rare minerals but also on refined forms—aiming to protect its own rare-metal processing technologies and production of semi-finished and finished products. This policy seeks to slow down technological development in competing nations and gain strategic advantages in future sectors (EVs, renewable energy, AI, military technologies).
Along with control over raw materials and processing capacities, China is investing intensively in scientific research and the development of new technologies for more efficient extraction, processing, and recycling of rare minerals. This allows it to lower production costs and increase its competitiveness in the global market.
Naturally, China also uses its dominant position in the rare minerals value chain as a tool for geopolitical leverage. Its official state policy includes negotiating strategic investments in mining projects worldwide and establishing long-term contracts with allies and partners.
China’s “Belt and Road” initiative often includes infrastructure development for mineral exploitation in partner countries. As a leading global player in critical raw material processing, China has for years invested in African mining infrastructure, including roads, ports, and processing facilities. Chinese companies hold dominant positions in cobalt mining and processing in the DRC, as well as in processing copper, nickel, and lithium.
Meanwhile, the West—primarily the United States and the European Union—is working to reduce its dependence on Chinese supply chains, investing in alternative projects in Africa. One such example is the “Lobito Corridor” railway, connecting Zambia and the DRC to a port in Angola, allowing the export of critical materials outside Chinese control.
Yet, the U.S. imports over 50% of its domestic consumption of 49 non-fuel minerals (such as lithium, copper, rare earth elements), and is 100% dependent on imports for 15 of them.
Moreover, the U.S. imports over 50% of 24 critical minerals from China, and a significant number from Russia. Clearly, this dependency poses a strategic threat to key sectors such as semiconductor manufacturing, military defense, and clean energy.
As a result, the Trump administration aimed to accelerate domestic mining of key minerals and simplify the process for obtaining permits on federal land.
However, mineral security cannot be achieved through domestic production alone, which is why the Biden administration joined allies like Australia, Canada, and the EU to establish the Minerals Security Partnership—an initiative focused on so-called “friendshoring” of mineral supplies.
Trump, by contrast, pursued a more aggressive approach, threatening to acquire Greenland and allegedly pressuring Ukraine to strike a deal on mineral exploitation.
This race for access to African minerals reflects a new form of global competition—not for territory, but for the resources of the future. However, Africa faces serious challenges that prevent it from fully capitalizing on its wealth.
The first and most critical issue is that most raw materials are exported in unprocessed form. This means African countries don’t capture the full economic value of their resources.
For example, bauxite is exported at about $80 per ton, while processed aluminum sells for around $2,500 per ton. The same applies to cobalt, lithium, and graphite.
The second problem is infrastructure. The lack of railways, ports, electricity, and industrial zones makes local processing and mineral transport difficult. Often, mines are located hundreds of kilometers from the nearest sea outlet, and roads are poorly maintained or nonexistent.
Africa holds about 30% of the world’s reserves of key minerals.
The third and perhaps most dangerous challenge is corruption and weak rule of law. Many African countries lack the capacity to regulate mining activity, leading to illegal extraction, smuggling, labor exploitation (including child labor), and multinational companies extracting profits without benefiting local communities. In the DRC, according to UN reports, significant quantities of coltan and cobalt are smuggled into neighboring countries, where they are then “legalized” and exported.
To reverse this situation and truly become the center of a new industrial era, African countries must carry out fundamental reforms. First, they need to invest in local mineral processing. Instead of exporting ore, countries like Angola, Zambia, or the DRC should develop factories to process copper, lithium, and cobalt, and establish facilities for battery component manufacturing. This would create added value, generate jobs, and advance technological development.
Second, regional cooperation is essential. Initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the African Mining Vision (AMV) offer opportunities for African countries to harmonize their policies, establish shared standards, and facilitate intra-African trade and investment.
Third, more transparent and equitable contracts with foreign investors are needed—ones that mandate local processing quotas, technology transfers, environmental protections, and local employment obligations. While such policies may create short-term friction with investors, they offer long-term benefits for African societies.
A notable example comes from South Africa, where the government is considering imposing an export tax on chrome to boost domestic stainless-steel production. Although mining companies warn of potential job losses, the government believes such a policy could redirect capital flows into the domestic industry. Similar initiatives are underway in Zambia, Namibia, and Angola, aiming to transform from raw material exporters into value-added producers.
In the global context, it is increasingly clear that future power will not depend solely on military or financial might, but also on access to and control over strategic resources. Africa now has a chance to shift from being a passive object of interest for great powers to an active player in shaping the world’s new industrial map. If it can modernize its infrastructure, establish stable institutions, curb corruption, and develop local processing industries, the continent could transform from a raw material exporter into a regional power—economically and politically.
In the end, the question is not whether Africa’s minerals will shape the future of global power—because that is already a given—but who will benefit from it.
Will it be foreign companies and governments extracting profit without deeper obligations? Or will it be the African people, who in the coming decades may use their natural resources to build inclusive, sustainable, and technologically advanced economies? The answer depends on decisions being made today in Africa’s capitals—and on their ability to recognize that the greatest wealth lies not just in the ground, but in knowing how to manage it.
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